Shared IT Infrastructure in Public Administration: Strategic Rationale, Models, Cybersecurity Challenges, and Mitigation Strategies

Abstract

The pervasive digital transformation of public sector operations necessitates the strategic adoption of shared Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. While this consolidation offers substantial advantages in terms of fiscal prudence, resource optimisation, enhanced inter-agency collaboration, and streamlined management, it simultaneously introduces a significantly expanded and complex attack surface. This comprehensive research report meticulously examines the strategic imperatives underpinning the shift towards shared IT systems within public administration, delineates the various architectural models employed for their implementation, and critically identifies the multifaceted cybersecurity risks inherent to such interconnected environments. Furthermore, it proposes an exhaustive suite of best practices and advanced mitigation strategies, drawing upon contemporary cybersecurity frameworks and industry expertise. The aim is to furnish policymakers, IT leaders, and cybersecurity professionals in the public sector with actionable insights to cultivate robust, resilient, and secure shared IT infrastructures.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

1. Introduction

The landscape of public administration is undergoing a profound digital metamorphosis, driven by demands for greater efficiency, transparency, and responsiveness in service delivery. Central to this transformation is the widespread adoption of shared IT infrastructures, a paradigm shift from traditional siloed systems where each governmental entity independently managed its own technological ecosystem. These shared systems represent a collaborative approach, enabling multiple public entities to access, utilise, and jointly maintain common computing resources, data repositories, network services, and applications. The theoretical premise behind this consolidation is compelling: by pooling resources, public bodies can achieve economies of scale, reduce redundant investments, and foster a more integrated approach to governance and service provision. The benefits extend beyond mere cost savings, promising enhanced operational efficiencies, improved inter-agency data exchange, and the potential for more coherent, citizen-centric public services.

However, the very interconnectedness and shared tenancy that define these infrastructures also give rise to significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The amalgamation of diverse networks, applications, and data from multiple agencies into a singular or highly integrated environment invariably expands the collective attack surface. A compromise in one segment or by one participating entity can, due to the inherent interdependencies, swiftly propagate across the entire shared ecosystem, potentially jeopardising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical public services and sensitive citizen data. The increasing sophistication and persistence of state-sponsored actors, organised cybercriminal groups, and even insider threats further amplify these risks, making the security of shared public sector IT infrastructure a paramount concern.

This report systematically explores the strategic rationale for the adoption of shared IT infrastructures, delving into the specific drivers that compel public sector entities towards this model. It then outlines the primary architectural models employed in their implementation, acknowledging the varying degrees of centralisation and autonomy that can be observed. A substantial portion of this research is dedicated to dissecting the unique and compounded cybersecurity challenges posed by such environments, moving beyond a superficial understanding to address the intricacies of expanded attack surfaces, single points of failure, rapid breach propagation, complex vendor ecosystems, and governance ambiguities. Finally, drawing upon leading cybersecurity frameworks and contemporary best practices, this report proposes a comprehensive set of mitigation strategies. These strategies encompass advanced security architectures like Zero Trust, granular network segmentation, robust identity and access management, proactive vulnerability management, stringent vendor risk controls, and the establishment of clear governance frameworks. By critically examining these facets, this report aims to equip relevant stakeholders with the knowledge necessary to navigate the complexities of shared IT infrastructure securely, thereby safeguarding public assets and maintaining citizen trust in an increasingly digital world.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

2. Strategic Rationale for Shared IT Infrastructure

The decision by public sector entities to transition towards shared IT infrastructures is rarely arbitrary. It is typically a calculated move driven by a confluence of economic, operational, and strategic imperatives aimed at modernising public administration and enhancing its capacity to deliver services effectively. The impetus often comes from government-wide initiatives seeking to reduce expenditure, improve inter-agency collaboration, and streamline complex IT landscapes.

2.1 Cost Efficiency and Resource Optimization

One of the most compelling arguments for adopting shared IT infrastructure in the public sector is the promise of significant cost savings and more efficient resource utilisation. In traditional models, each government agency or department operates its own distinct IT environment, often leading to considerable redundancy in hardware, software, personnel, and infrastructure. Shared services directly address this inefficiency:

• Consolidated Procurement: By pooling demand, public entities can achieve greater purchasing power. Instead of numerous small-scale software license agreements or hardware purchases, a shared service model facilitates large, consolidated enterprise agreements, often securing more favourable terms, discounts, and long-term contracts. This extends to infrastructure components like servers, storage arrays, and network devices, where bulk purchases yield substantial savings.

• Reduced Capital Expenditure (CapEx): The need for individual agencies to invest heavily in their own physical data centres, server rooms, and associated infrastructure (power, cooling, physical security) is drastically reduced or eliminated. Instead, investments can be consolidated into fewer, larger, and more efficient shared data centres, or transitioned into operational expenditures (OpEx) through cloud-based shared services. This shifts the financial burden from large upfront investments to more manageable, predictable ongoing operational costs.

• Operational Expenditure (OpEx) Efficiencies: Maintenance, support, and utility costs for IT infrastructure are significantly lowered. A single team can manage and maintain a larger, consolidated infrastructure, reducing the overall personnel footprint required. Shared services can also optimise energy consumption through larger, more efficient data centres, implementing advanced cooling technologies and server virtualisation that would be cost-prohibitive for smaller, individual agency operations.

• Specialised Expertise Utilisation: Recruitment and retention of highly skilled IT professionals, particularly in niche areas like cybersecurity, data analytics, or enterprise architecture, can be challenging and expensive for individual agencies. A shared service model allows for the creation of centralised expert teams whose skills can be leveraged across multiple participating entities. This ensures a higher level of technical proficiency and specialisation, which might otherwise be unaffordable or unattainable for smaller departments. For instance, a dedicated cybersecurity operations centre (SOC) or a team of penetration testers can serve an entire state government, providing a level of protection far exceeding what individual agencies could afford. This resource optimisation extends to training, as a common platform requires standardised training for personnel, leading to more efficient skill development.

• Economies of Scale and Scope: Shared infrastructure inherently leverages economies of scale, where the cost per unit of service decreases as the volume of services increases. Furthermore, it enables economies of scope, where providing a greater variety of services through a shared platform is more efficient than providing each service independently. This is particularly relevant for common enterprise applications like Human Resources (HR) systems, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), or customer relationship management (CRM) systems that can be adapted for use across multiple government departments.

2.2 Enhanced Collaboration and Service Delivery

Beyond economic incentives, shared IT systems serve as a powerful catalyst for improved collaboration among public entities and consequently, more cohesive service delivery to citizens.

• Unified Platform for Data Sharing: Shared infrastructures provide the foundational technology layer for seamless data exchange. When agencies operate on common platforms or interoperable systems, the barriers to data sharing are significantly reduced. This is crucial in scenarios requiring rapid information flow, such as emergency response where police, fire, and health services need immediate access to shared intelligence, or in social services where different agencies might support the same family but require a unified view of their needs without duplicating efforts.

• Citizen-Centric Services: The traditional siloed approach often means citizens have to navigate multiple government portals and provide the same information repeatedly to different departments. Shared IT platforms facilitate a ‘tell us once’ principle. By enabling backend data integration and a unified digital identity for citizens, shared systems can support the creation of single online portals that offer a comprehensive suite of government services, improving user experience and efficiency. This leads to more coordinated service delivery, as agencies can access and exchange information seamlessly, fostering a more holistic approach to public service.

• Improved Data Analytics and Policy Making: Aggregating data from various governmental functions onto a shared platform, while rigorously adhering to privacy and data protection regulations, can unlock unprecedented opportunities for data analytics. This consolidated view can provide policymakers with deeper insights into societal trends, program effectiveness, and resource allocation, leading to more evidence-based decision-making and better public policy formulation. For example, anonymised, aggregated health data combined with social welfare data could inform public health initiatives more effectively.

• Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity: In a shared model, disaster recovery (DR) and business continuity (BC) capabilities can be centrally planned and implemented, benefiting all participating agencies. This often involves geographically redundant data centres and robust backup strategies that would be prohibitively expensive for individual departments. Shared DR capabilities ensure that critical public services can be restored faster and more reliably in the event of a catastrophic failure, strengthening governmental resilience.

2.3 Simplified Management and Standardization

Implementing a shared IT infrastructure inherently drives towards standardisation, which in turn simplifies management and enhances overall operational efficiency and security posture.

• Uniform Protocols and Security Measures: A shared environment necessitates the adoption of common technical standards, protocols, and security policies across all participating entities. This standardisation simplifies network configurations, software deployments, and system updates. Crucially, it allows for the consistent application of security measures, ensuring that all connected components adhere to the same baseline level of protection, rather than disparate, potentially inconsistent security postures across individual agencies.

• Streamlined Operations and Training: With standardised systems and processes, IT operations become more predictable and efficient. Patch management, software updates, configuration management, and help desk support can be centralised and streamlined. Training for IT personnel and end-users becomes more straightforward as they operate within a common technological framework, reducing the learning curve and improving overall competency. This also facilitates easier mobility for IT staff between departments, as they are familiar with the shared systems.

• Centralised Oversight and Governance: Shared IT infrastructure naturally lends itself to centralised governance. A single oversight body or committee can establish and enforce common IT policies, security standards, and architectural guidelines. This ensures greater accountability, reduces shadow IT, and promotes a cohesive IT strategy across the public sector. It also streamlines compliance efforts, as a single framework can address various regulatory requirements (e.g., GDPR, NIST, ISO 27001) that apply across multiple agencies.

• Improved Interoperability: Standardisation is a prerequisite for true interoperability. By establishing common data formats, APIs (Application Programming Interfaces), and communication protocols, shared systems ensure that different applications and services, even if managed by different agencies, can seamlessly interact and exchange information. This is vital for building integrated e-government services and for future-proofing the public sector’s digital capabilities.

In essence, the strategic rationale for shared IT infrastructure in the public sector is rooted in the drive to achieve more with less, while simultaneously enhancing the quality and coherence of public services. However, these benefits are contingent upon a thorough understanding and proactive management of the inherent complexities and cybersecurity risks that accompany such a transformative approach.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

3. Models of Shared IT Infrastructure in Public Administration

The implementation of shared IT infrastructure in the public sector is not monolithic; various architectural models exist, each presenting a distinct balance between central control, agency autonomy, and complexity. The choice of model often depends on political will, organisational culture, the maturity of IT capabilities, and the specific strategic objectives.

3.1 Centralized Model

In the centralized model, a single designated entity assumes full responsibility for the management, operation, and security of the shared IT infrastructure on behalf of all participating public organisations. This central entity could be a dedicated shared services agency, a specific ministry with strong IT capabilities, or a government-wide IT department. All resources – physical infrastructure (data centres), networks, core applications (e.g., email, ERP), and often even end-user computing services – are owned and controlled by this central body.

Advantages:

• Highest Consistency and Standardization: A centralized model naturally leads to the highest degree of standardisation in hardware, software, processes, and security policies. This uniformity simplifies management, patching, and ensures a consistent user experience across agencies.
• Stronger Economies of Scale: By consolidating all resources under one management, this model typically achieves the most significant cost efficiencies through bulk procurement, optimised resource utilisation, and reduced administrative overhead.
• Easier Policy Enforcement: Security policies, compliance mandates, and operational procedures can be uniformly enforced across the entire infrastructure, leading to a more robust and predictable security posture. It simplifies compliance auditing and ensures adherence to government-wide regulations.
• Dedicated Expert Teams: The central entity can afford to employ highly specialised IT and cybersecurity professionals (e.g., network architects, security analysts, database administrators) who serve all agencies, providing a level of expertise that individual smaller departments could not sustain.
• Streamlined Governance: With a single point of ownership and accountability, decision-making related to IT strategy, investment, and security can be streamlined, avoiding inter-agency disputes over resource allocation or technical direction.

Disadvantages:

• Single Point of Failure (and Trust): This is the most critical disadvantage from a cybersecurity perspective. If the central system, network, or data centre is compromised or experiences a major outage, all connected entities and their services are at risk of disruption or data breach. A compromise of the central identity provider, for example, could grant an attacker access to all federated applications. This concentration of risk necessitates exceptionally robust security and resilience measures.
• Potential for Bureaucracy and Inflexibility: A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach can emerge, potentially stifling innovation or failing to adequately meet the unique, specialised requirements of individual agencies. Centralised control can lead to bureaucratic decision-making processes, slow down development cycles, and reduce agency agility.
• Reduced Agency Autonomy and Buy-in: Individual agencies may feel a loss of control over their IT destiny, leading to resistance, lack of ownership, or even the proliferation of ‘shadow IT’ systems if central services are perceived as inadequate or unresponsive. This can undermine the very benefits of consolidation.
• High Initial Transition Costs: Migrating diverse legacy systems from multiple agencies to a single, standardised central platform can be a monumental task, involving significant upfront investment, complex data migration, and potential service disruptions.
• Data Concentration Risk: Housing all or most sensitive public data in a single logical or physical location makes it an incredibly attractive target for advanced persistent threats (APTs) and cybercriminals. The impact of a successful breach would be catastrophic.

Examples: Centralised cloud infrastructure services provided by a national government agency, a shared email system for an entire state government, or a single ERP system implemented across all ministries.

3.2 Federated Model

The federated model strikes a different balance, allowing each participating entity to retain a greater degree of control over its own IT resources and operations, while still adhering to common standards, protocols, and a shared governance framework. In this model, IT infrastructure components might be distributed, but interoperability and communication are enabled through agreed-upon interfaces and policies.

Advantages:

• Greater Agency Autonomy and Flexibility: Agencies retain control over their specific applications, data, and specialised IT needs, allowing them to tailor solutions that best fit their missions. This fosters greater ownership and buy-in from individual departments.
• Distributed Risk: Unlike the centralized model, a compromise or failure in one agency’s IT environment is less likely to instantaneously affect all other participants, as core infrastructure components are often independently managed. The ‘blast radius’ of a breach is potentially smaller.
• Faster Innovation: Individual agencies can adopt new technologies or develop specific applications more rapidly without navigating central bureaucracy, fostering innovation and responsiveness to specific needs.
• Scalability: The federated model can be highly scalable, allowing new agencies to join the shared framework without requiring a massive overhaul of a central system. Each agency simply integrates its systems according to the agreed standards.
• Leveraging Existing Investments: Agencies can often continue to utilise their existing, often substantial, IT investments, gradually integrating them into the federated framework rather than undergoing costly rip-and-replace initiatives.

Disadvantages:

• Inconsistent Security Practices: Despite common standards, actual implementation and enforcement of security policies can vary significantly across agencies. This can create weak links in the overall shared security posture, as an attacker only needs to find the least secure entry point.
• Complex Governance and Coordination: Establishing and maintaining common standards, ensuring interoperability, and coordinating shared services (e.g., incident response) across autonomous entities is challenging. It requires robust governance structures, continuous communication, and strong leadership to ensure compliance and resolve disputes.
• Integration Challenges: While standards are agreed upon, the technical complexities of integrating disparate systems, databases, and applications from various agencies can be significant, often requiring custom development and ongoing maintenance of interfaces.
• Difficulty Achieving True Economies of Scale: While some shared benefits may exist (e.g., common identity management), the overall cost savings are typically less pronounced than in a centralized model due to continued duplication of some resources and personnel at the agency level.
• ‘Shadow IT’ Risks: Without strong central oversight, there’s a higher risk of agencies deploying unapproved or insecure IT solutions outside the shared framework, creating additional vulnerabilities.

Examples: National identity management systems where each government service integrates using common protocols; data sharing networks for research or law enforcement where data remains at source but is accessible via a federated query system; shared network infrastructure where each agency manages its own servers and applications.

3.3 Hybrid Model

The hybrid model seeks to combine the strengths of both centralized and federated approaches, offering a flexible architecture that attempts to balance efficiency and control with autonomy and flexibility. It typically involves centralizing certain critical, high-value, or common infrastructure components, while allowing individual agencies to manage other, more specialised aspects of their IT.

Components often Centralized:

• Core Infrastructure: Network backbone, primary data centres, internet gateways, enterprise directory services (e.g., Active Directory), and potentially email services.
• Enterprise Applications: Common platforms like ERP systems, financial management systems, or HR systems that benefit greatly from standardisation and central management.
• Security Services: Centralised Security Operations Centres (SOCs), threat intelligence platforms, enterprise-wide firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and security information and event management (SIEM) systems.
• Shared Data Storage: Large-scale, highly available data storage solutions for common datasets or archival purposes.

Components often Federated (managed by individual agencies):

• Agency-Specific Applications: Niche software solutions critical to a particular agency’s mission that may not be suitable for a centralised ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.
• Specialised Databases: Databases containing highly sensitive or unique agency data, where direct control and tailored security measures are paramount.
• End-User Computing: Desktops, laptops, and peripheral devices, with agencies often retaining control over their specific configurations and software.
• Local Network Segments: Management of departmental Local Area Networks (LANs) and specific network devices within an agency’s immediate operational purview.

Advantages:

• Optimized Balance: Aims to achieve the best of both worlds, leveraging economies of scale for common services while providing flexibility for unique agency needs.
• Gradual Transition: Allows for a phased migration strategy, where certain services are centralised first, making the transition less disruptive and more manageable.
• Tailored Security: Critical, high-risk components can receive enhanced, centrally managed security, while agencies maintain flexibility for their specific security requirements on their systems.
• Resilience: By distributing some aspects, it can mitigate the single point of failure risk inherent in a purely centralized model, as not all services are solely dependent on a single central component.

Disadvantages:

• Highest Complexity in Governance: Managing the interplay between centralised and federated components requires extremely sophisticated governance structures, clear roles and responsibilities, and continuous coordination. Ambiguity can quickly lead to inefficiencies and security gaps.
• Integration Challenges: The integration of diverse systems – some centrally managed, others agency-specific – is inherently complex. This often requires custom connectors, APIs, and extensive interoperability testing.
• Potential for ‘Hybrid Complexity Trap’: If not meticulously planned and managed, a hybrid model can accrue the disadvantages of both centralized bureaucracy and federated inconsistencies without fully realising the benefits of either. It can lead to overlapping responsibilities, fragmented security, and increased operational overhead.
• Skill Set Requirements: Demands a broad range of technical expertise for both centralised and distributed components, as well as strong architectural and project management skills.

Examples: A state government that uses a centralised cloud for common applications and enterprise email, but allows individual departments to host their unique, mission-critical applications on their own on-premises servers or in agency-specific cloud subscriptions, all connected via a shared network backbone. Shared cybersecurity services (e.g., threat intelligence, SOC) might be centralized, while individual agencies manage their own endpoint security.

3.4 Emerging Models: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Cloud-based Shared Services

Beyond these traditional models, the public sector is increasingly exploring:

• Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Here, private sector companies design, build, finance, operate, and maintain IT infrastructure for public entities. This can offer access to private sector innovation, expertise, and capital, but requires meticulous contract management, clear delineation of responsibilities, and robust oversight to ensure public interest and security are maintained. The shared infrastructure is managed by a third-party vendor, introducing unique supply chain risks.

• Cloud-based Shared Services: Leveraging commercial cloud platforms (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) for shared services. This offers immense scalability, flexibility, and often advanced security features. However, it introduces concerns around data sovereignty, vendor lock-in, compliance with public sector regulations in a multi-tenant environment, and the need for rigorous cloud security posture management. The underlying infrastructure is shared with other public and private tenants, intensifying the need for robust segmentation and access controls.

Each model carries its own set of trade-offs, particularly concerning cybersecurity. The chosen approach must align with the specific strategic goals, risk appetite, and operational capabilities of the public sector entities involved, with a constant emphasis on robust security measures tailored to the architectural complexities.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

4. Cybersecurity Challenges in Shared IT Infrastructure

The benefits of shared IT infrastructure in the public sector are undeniable, yet they come with a significant increase in the complexity and magnitude of cybersecurity challenges. The very essence of sharing – interconnectedness and consolidation – creates new avenues for attack and amplifies the potential impact of breaches. These challenges require a nuanced and comprehensive understanding to develop effective mitigation strategies.

4.1 Expanded Attack Surface

The integration of multiple entities into a shared IT infrastructure inherently expands the attack surface, creating more entry points and pathways for cyber adversaries. This expansion is multi-dimensional:

• Interconnected Networks and APIs: Shared environments rely on intricate networks linking disparate systems and agencies. Each connection point, API endpoint, and network device (routers, switches, firewalls) represents a potential vulnerability. An attacker exploiting a weak API in one agency might gain a foothold to traverse to other connected systems.
• Increased User Base and Endpoints: The total number of users (employees, contractors) and their associated endpoints (laptops, mobile devices, IoT sensors) significantly increases in a shared ecosystem. This broadens the scope for phishing attacks, credential compromise, and malware infections, as adversaries only need one successful compromise to begin lateral movement.
• Shared Databases and Applications: Consolidating data and applications means that a vulnerability in a single shared database or application could expose sensitive information belonging to multiple agencies. For example, a SQL injection flaw in a shared citizen portal could compromise data across numerous departments.
• Common Services Exposure: Services like DNS, directory services (e.g., Active Directory), email servers, and web proxies are often shared. A compromise of these fundamental services can grant attackers pervasive control or observation capabilities across the entire shared infrastructure.
• Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: As explored further below, shared services often depend on a complex web of third-party vendors. A vulnerability or compromise within a single vendor’s software or service can ripple across all public sector entities using that shared component, creating a widespread supply chain attack vector.
• Insider Threat Amplification: While often overlooked, the insider threat is amplified. A malicious or negligent insider with legitimate access to shared resources can cause widespread damage, as their compromised credentials or actions can affect multiple agencies simultaneously due to the broader scope of their access.

Cybercriminals actively seek to exploit these expanded perimeters. They might target a less secure partner agency to gain initial access, then use the interconnectedness to pivot to more valuable targets within the shared environment, leveraging techniques like lateral movement, privilege escalation, and network reconnaissance across the consolidated infrastructure.

4.2 Single Point of Failure and Trust

Particularly pronounced in centralized models, the concept of a single point of failure (SPOF) becomes a critical cybersecurity concern. If a central system, database, or network component is compromised or experiences a catastrophic failure, the repercussions can be devastating for all connected entities.

• Concentration of Sensitive Data: Centralized shared infrastructures often consolidate vast amounts of sensitive public data – citizen records, financial information, classified government data – making them highly attractive targets. A successful data breach could lead to mass data exfiltration affecting millions of individuals and multiple governmental functions, resulting in severe reputational damage, legal liabilities, and operational paralysis.
• Widespread Service Disruption: A denial-of-service (DoS) attack, ransomware infection, or hardware failure affecting a central component can bring down critical public services across an entire region or nation. This could impact emergency services, public transportation, healthcare systems, or financial transactions, with potentially severe societal and economic consequences.
• Single Point of Trust: Beyond physical or logical components, shared systems often rely on a single, centralized identity provider or certificate authority. If this ‘point of trust’ is compromised, attackers could forge identities, impersonate legitimate users, or gain unauthorised access to numerous systems and applications across the entire ecosystem, effectively undermining the foundation of secure authentication and authorisation. This is a profound risk, as demonstrated by incidents where compromised certificate authorities have allowed attackers to issue fraudulent digital certificates.

Mitigating SPOFs requires extensive redundancy, fault tolerance, and geographic distribution, alongside robust cybersecurity controls. However, the inherent architectural design of centralized shared services means that the risk can only be mitigated, never entirely eliminated, making comprehensive resilience planning paramount.

4.3 Rapid Breach Propagation

In a shared IT environment, the interconnectedness that facilitates collaboration also acts as an accelerant for cyberattacks. A security breach in one entity can quickly propagate to others, leading to a much larger and more impactful incident than if systems were isolated. This ‘blast radius’ expansion is a defining characteristic of shared infrastructure risks.

• Worm-like Malware and Ransomware: Malicious software designed to spread automatically can leverage the shared network segments and common services to rapidly infect multiple systems across different agencies. Ransomware, in particular, can encrypt vast quantities of data from numerous departments almost simultaneously, leading to widespread operational paralysis and significant recovery challenges.
• Compromised Credentials: If an attacker obtains privileged credentials from one agency, the shared nature of identity and access management (e.g., a shared Active Directory domain) can allow them to move laterally across the entire infrastructure, gaining access to systems belonging to other participating entities. This horizontal movement can be incredibly difficult to detect and contain.
• Misconfigurations in Shared Security Tools: A misconfiguration in a centrally managed firewall, IDS/IPS, or endpoint detection and response (EDR) system, or an incorrect security policy pushed out to all endpoints, can inadvertently create a widespread vulnerability that attackers can quickly exploit across the entire shared environment.
• Dependency Chain Exploitation: Many shared services have complex interdependencies. A breach in a foundational service (e.g., shared virtualisation platform, network management tool) can compromise all services built upon it, leading to a cascading failure or breach effect.

The challenge lies in the speed with which such propagation can occur, often overwhelming the incident response capabilities of individual agencies. This necessitates highly coordinated, real-time threat detection and response mechanisms across the entire shared infrastructure.

4.4 Complex Vendor Management and Supply Chain Risk

Shared IT infrastructures frequently involve a multitude of external vendors and service providers supplying various hardware, software, and managed services. This reliance on third parties introduces a significant layer of complexity and risk, often described as ‘supply chain risk’.

• Third-Party Risk (Nth Party Risk): Public sector entities are not only reliant on their direct vendors but also on those vendors’ suppliers (Nth parties). A security lapse at any point in this extended supply chain can directly impact the shared infrastructure. This multi-layered dependency makes it incredibly difficult to assess and manage the overall risk comprehensively.
• Supply Chain Attacks: The public sector has been a primary target for sophisticated supply chain attacks, where adversaries compromise a widely used software or hardware component from a trusted vendor to gain access to all organisations using that product. Notable examples like the SolarWinds attack (en.wikipedia.org) demonstrate the devastating potential of such tactics, where a single vendor compromise can provide a backdoor into thousands of government and corporate networks.
• Ensuring Consistent Security Postures: It is challenging to ensure that all vendors adhere to the stringent security standards and compliance requirements of the public sector. Diverse vendors may have varying security maturities, internal controls, and incident response capabilities, creating potential weak links in the shared infrastructure’s overall defence.
• Contractual Ambiguity and Responsibility: Defining clear contractual agreements for security responsibilities, incident response protocols, data ownership, and audit rights across a complex vendor ecosystem can be arduous. Ambiguity in these contracts can lead to disputes and delays during a security incident.
• Lack of Transparency: Gaining sufficient visibility into a vendor’s internal security practices, audit results, and vulnerability management processes can be difficult, hindering effective risk assessment and ongoing monitoring.
• Regulatory Compliance Burden: Public sector entities are often subject to strict regulatory compliance (e.g., data privacy laws). Ensuring that all third-party vendors processing or storing public data meet these requirements adds a significant burden to vendor management.

Effective vendor risk management is no longer a peripheral concern but a central pillar of cybersecurity for shared public sector IT. It requires continuous due diligence, robust contractual agreements, and ongoing monitoring of vendor security postures.

4.5 Governance and Accountability Ambiguity

One of the most profound, yet often underestimated, challenges in shared public sector IT infrastructure is the ambiguity surrounding governance, roles, and accountability. When multiple agencies share an infrastructure managed by a separate entity, clarity on who is responsible for what aspects of security can quickly become blurred.

• Delineation of Responsibilities: It is often unclear who holds ultimate responsibility for security controls, incident response, and data protection in a shared environment. Is it the central managing entity, the individual agency whose data was breached, or a shared responsibility model (e.g., in cloud environments)? Without clear lines of authority and accountability, security gaps emerge, and incident response efforts can be paralysed by inter-agency disputes.
• Establishing Common Policies: Developing and enforcing a unified set of security policies, standards, and guidelines that all participating agencies must adhere to can be politically and practically challenging. Agencies may have differing risk appetites, existing legacy policies, or specific legislative mandates that conflict with a common framework.
• Funding Models for Shared Cybersecurity: Adequately funding shared cybersecurity services, infrastructure upgrades, and expert staff can be a point of contention. Allocation of costs among participating agencies often lacks transparency or fair distribution, potentially leading to underinvestment in critical security capabilities.
• Legal and Regulatory Complexities: Different public sector agencies may operate under varying legal mandates and regulations (e.g., health data vs. law enforcement data vs. general administrative data). Harmonising these diverse compliance requirements within a single shared infrastructure poses significant legal and technical hurdles.
• Resistance to Central Oversight: Agencies may resist giving up control or submitting to central security mandates, particularly if they perceive a loss of autonomy or if the central service is seen as unresponsive to their specific needs. This can lead to non-compliance or the development of insecure workarounds.

Effective governance requires clear policy frameworks, formal Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), and potentially legislative mandates that clearly define roles, responsibilities, funding mechanisms, and accountability for security across all stakeholders in the shared ecosystem.

4.6 Legacy Systems Integration

The public sector typically grapples with a vast array of legacy IT systems – outdated hardware, operating systems, and applications that have been in use for decades. Integrating these legacy components into a modern shared IT infrastructure presents formidable cybersecurity challenges.

• Security Gaps in Legacy Systems: Older systems often lack modern security features, are difficult to patch, and may contain known vulnerabilities for which no patches are available. Connecting these insecure systems to a modern shared environment creates a significant weak link that attackers can exploit to gain entry or pivot to more secure systems.
• Interoperability Issues: Legacy systems often use proprietary protocols, outdated data formats, and non-standard interfaces, making their integration with modern, standardised shared platforms complex, costly, and prone to errors. Custom integration layers themselves can introduce new vulnerabilities.
• Increased Attack Surface of Migration: The process of migrating data and applications from legacy systems to a shared infrastructure creates temporary but significant attack surfaces. Data in transit, temporary staging environments, and legacy systems running in parallel during transition periods are all prime targets for exploitation.
• Cost and Complexity of Modernisation: Modernising or replacing legacy components is a costly and time-consuming endeavour, often requiring significant budgetary allocation and expert resources. The public sector’s fiscal constraints can impede this essential modernisation, perpetuating security risks.
• Dependence on Obsolete Skills: Maintaining legacy systems often requires specialised skills that are becoming increasingly rare, leading to reliance on a small pool of experts and difficulty in addressing security issues promptly.

The presence of legacy systems necessitates a strategic approach that prioritises risk, isolates vulnerable components, and systematically plans for their secure modernisation or decommissioning within the shared infrastructure framework.

4.7 Human Factor and Training Inconsistencies

Even the most technologically advanced security measures can be undermined by human error or malicious intent. In a shared IT infrastructure, the human factor becomes a compounded cybersecurity challenge due to the sheer number of users and the potential for inconsistent training and security cultures across diverse agencies.

• Increased Exposure to Human Error: The complexity of shared systems, combined with a broader user base, increases the likelihood of human error – misconfigurations, accidental data exposure, or falling victim to social engineering attacks (e.g., phishing).
• Inconsistent Security Awareness and Training: While a central entity might provide security training, its effectiveness can vary widely across different agencies due to differing priorities, compliance cultures, and resource availability. This creates an uneven landscape of security awareness, where the least trained individual can become the entry point for an attack affecting all.
• Amplified Insider Threat: A disgruntled employee or a compromised account in any participating agency can, due to broad access within the shared infrastructure, cause widespread damage or exfiltrate significant amounts of data impacting multiple entities. The challenge lies in monitoring and managing a larger, more diverse pool of potential insiders.
• Varied Security Culture: Each public sector agency typically has its own organisational culture, including its approach to cybersecurity. Fostering a unified, robust security culture across an entire shared ecosystem is challenging but essential. A weak security culture in one area can undermine the efforts of others.

Addressing the human factor requires continuous, targeted security awareness training, strict enforcement of security policies, and robust internal threat detection mechanisms across the entire shared environment.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

5. Mitigation Strategies for Cybersecurity Risks

Addressing the complex cybersecurity challenges presented by shared IT infrastructure in the public sector requires a multi-layered, strategic approach. No single solution is sufficient; rather, a comprehensive suite of interlocking strategies, aligned with established cybersecurity frameworks, is necessary to build resilience and secure public services.

5.1 Implementing Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)

Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) stands as a foundational and transformative security model, particularly potent for mitigating the expanded attack surface and rapid breach propagation risks inherent in shared environments. ZTA operates on the principle of ‘never trust, always verify’, meaning that no user, device, or application is implicitly trusted, regardless of its location (inside or outside the traditional network perimeter). All access requests are rigorously authenticated, authorised, and continuously validated.

Core Principles of ZTA:

• Verify Explicitly: All access to resources must be explicitly and continuously authenticated and authorised based on all available data points, including user identity, device posture, location, service, and data sensitivity.
• Least Privilege Access: Users and systems are granted only the minimum necessary access required to perform their functions (just-in-time and just-enough-access). This significantly limits an attacker’s ability to move laterally even if initial credentials are compromised.
• Assume Breach: ZTA design acknowledges that breaches will inevitably occur. Therefore, security controls are designed to contain breaches rapidly, limit their impact, and enable swift recovery, rather than solely focusing on perimeter defence.
• Micro-segmentation: Network perimeters are broken down into small, isolated segments. Access policies are applied to individual workloads or applications, preventing lateral movement even within the same network segment.
• Continuous Monitoring and Threat Detection: All network traffic, user activities, and device statuses are continuously monitored for anomalies and potential threats, enabling real-time detection and response. This shifts focus from static, perimeter-based security to dynamic, adaptive controls.

How ZTA Counters Shared Infrastructure Risks:

• Mitigates Expanded Attack Surface: By requiring explicit verification for every access request, ZTA renders many traditional attack vectors less effective. Even if an attacker gains a foothold via a vulnerable endpoint, their ability to move to other shared resources is severely restricted by granular access policies.
• Prevents Rapid Breach Propagation: Micro-segmentation and least privilege principles mean that a compromise in one agency’s segment cannot easily spread to others. The ‘blast radius’ is contained, allowing for targeted remediation.
• Addresses Single Point of Trust: ZTA decentralises trust decisions, moving away from reliance on a single, implicit network perimeter. Each access request builds trust dynamically, rather than assuming it based on network location alone. This significantly hardens identity and access management (arxiv.org).

Implementing ZTA in a complex public sector shared environment is a multi-year journey, requiring significant architectural changes, investment in new tools, and a cultural shift. It often involves integrating technologies like multi-factor authentication (MFA), privileged access management (PAM), micro-segmentation platforms, and advanced identity governance solutions.

5.2 Network Segmentation and Micro-segmentation

Network segmentation is a critical strategy for containing cybersecurity threats and limiting their propagation within a shared IT infrastructure. It involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated zones, with strict access controls governing traffic between these zones.

• Traditional Network Segmentation: This involves using VLANs (Virtual Local Area Networks), subnets, and firewalls to create logical boundaries between different departments, functions, or classifications of data within the shared infrastructure. For instance, separating the HR department’s network from the finance department’s network, or isolating public-facing web servers from internal administrative networks.
• Micro-segmentation: This takes segmentation to a much more granular level, often down to individual workloads, applications, or even containers. It involves defining and enforcing security policies at the host or hypervisor level, allowing precise control over east-west (internal network) traffic. For example, ensuring that a specific application server can only communicate with its designated database server, even if they reside on the same physical network segment.

Benefits of Segmentation:

• Breach Containment: If a breach occurs in one segment, attackers are prevented from easily moving to other segments, significantly limiting the ‘blast radius’ and impact of an attack (hayscomm.com).
• Reduced Attack Surface (within segments): Each segment has its own defined perimeter and access policies, reducing the internal attack surface for lateral movement.
• Improved Compliance: Segmentation helps organisations meet regulatory requirements by isolating sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information, classified data) into specific, controlled zones.
• Enhanced Monitoring: Traffic flows between segments can be meticulously monitored, making it easier to detect anomalous behaviour and potential intrusions.
• Isolation of Critical Assets: Highly sensitive or mission-critical systems can be placed in their own heavily secured segments, providing an additional layer of protection.

Implementing effective segmentation requires a deep understanding of network traffic flows, application dependencies, and meticulous policy definition and enforcement. It is an ongoing process that must adapt as the shared infrastructure evolves.

5.3 Regular Security Assessments, Penetration Testing, and Vulnerability Management

Proactive identification and remediation of vulnerabilities are indispensable in securing shared public sector IT infrastructure. This involves a continuous cycle of assessment, testing, and management.

• Security Assessments: These are systematic evaluations of the security posture of the shared infrastructure. They include:
  • Vulnerability Scans: Automated tools to identify known vulnerabilities in operating systems, applications, and network devices.
  • Configuration Audits: Reviewing system and application configurations against established security baselines and best practices.
  • Risk Assessments: Identifying, analysing, and evaluating risks to information systems and data, considering potential threats, vulnerabilities, and their impact.
  • Security Architecture Reviews: Expert evaluation of the design and implementation of security controls within the shared infrastructure.
• Penetration Testing (Pen Testing): Goes beyond identifying vulnerabilities to actively attempting to exploit them in a controlled manner, mimicking real-world attacker tactics. This helps validate the effectiveness of existing security controls and identify pathways for compromise. Types include:
  • Black Box Testing: Simulating an external attacker with no prior knowledge of the internal system.
  • White Box Testing: Providing testers with full knowledge of the system, including source code and network diagrams.
  • Grey Box Testing: A hybrid approach, providing partial knowledge to simulate an insider threat or a compromised external user.
  • Red Teaming: A full-scope simulation of a real attack, challenging the organisation’s detection and response capabilities across people, process, and technology.
• Vulnerability Management Program: A continuous, systematic process for identifying, classifying, prioritising, remediating, and mitigating vulnerabilities. This includes:
  • Patch Management: Ensuring that all operating systems, applications, and firmware across the shared infrastructure are regularly updated with the latest security patches.
  • Configuration Management: Maintaining secure baseline configurations and preventing drift.
  • Remediation Prioritisation: Focusing resources on addressing the most critical vulnerabilities first, based on exploitability and potential impact. (moldstud.com)
• Continuous Monitoring and Threat Intelligence: Integrating security assessments with continuous monitoring capabilities (e.g., Security Information and Event Management – SIEM, Security Orchestration, Automation and Response – SOAR) and leveraging threat intelligence feeds to stay abreast of emerging threats specific to the public sector and shared infrastructure. Establishing a shared Security Operations Center (SOC) provides centralized oversight and detection capabilities across all participating agencies.

These proactive measures allow public sector entities to identify and address weaknesses before they can be exploited, significantly improving the overall security posture and resilience of the shared IT infrastructure.

5.4 Strong Access Controls, Identity, and Access Management (IAM)

Robust access controls and a comprehensive Identity and Access Management (IAM) strategy are fundamental to securing shared IT infrastructure. They ensure that only authenticated and authorised individuals and systems can access sensitive information and resources, mitigating the risks of unauthorised access and insider threats (jpmorgan.com).

• Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Mandating MFA for all users, especially those with privileged access, adds a crucial layer of security. MFA requires users to provide two or more verification factors (e.g., password + security token, biometric scan) before gaining access, making it significantly harder for attackers to compromise accounts even if they steal passwords.
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC):
  • RBAC: Access permissions are assigned to specific roles (e.g., ‘HR Manager’, ‘Finance Analyst’), and users are assigned to those roles. This simplifies management and ensures consistency.
  • ABAC: Granular access decisions are made based on attributes of the user (e.g., department, clearance level), the resource (e.g., data sensitivity), and the environment (e.g., time of day, location). ABAC offers more flexible and fine-grained control, crucial for complex shared environments with diverse data classifications.
• Privileged Access Management (PAM): Dedicated solutions to secure, manage, and monitor privileged accounts (administrators, service accounts). PAM systems enforce strong password policies, rotate credentials, record privileged sessions, and implement just-in-time access for administrative tasks, significantly reducing the risk of privilege escalation and lateral movement.
• Identity Governance and Administration (IGA): An IGA framework automates and streamlines identity lifecycle management, including user provisioning (granting access), de-provisioning (revoking access upon departure), and access reviews. Regular access reviews are crucial to ensure that users only have the permissions they require, preventing ‘privilege creep’.
• Single Sign-On (SSO): Implementing SSO allows users to authenticate once to a central identity provider and then gain access to multiple applications and services across the shared infrastructure without re-entering credentials. This enhances user experience while centralising authentication and auditing.
• Strong Password Policies: Enforcing complex password requirements, regular password changes (though MFA reduces reliance on this), and preventing the reuse of old passwords across all participating agencies.

An effective IAM strategy must be centrally managed but extensible to all federated components, ensuring consistent application of policies and continuous monitoring of access patterns across the entire shared environment.

5.5 Vendor Risk Management and Supply Chain Security

Given the complexity of vendor ecosystems in shared IT infrastructures, robust vendor risk management (VRM) and supply chain security practices are paramount to mitigate third-party risks (travelers.com). This extends beyond direct vendors to the ‘Nth parties’ within the supply chain.

• Pre-Contractual Due Diligence: Before engaging a vendor, public sector entities must conduct thorough security assessments. This includes:
  • Security Questionnaires: Detailed inquiries into the vendor’s cybersecurity controls, policies, and practices.
  • Audits and Certifications: Requesting evidence of security certifications (e.g., ISO 27001, SOC 2 Type 2) and independent audit reports.
  • Penetration Test Results: Reviewing recent penetration test reports for the vendor’s services and infrastructure.
  • Financial Stability Checks: Assessing a vendor’s financial health, as instability can impact security investments and service continuity.
• Robust Contractual Agreements: Security clauses must be explicitly embedded in all vendor contracts for shared services. These should specify:
  • Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for Security: Clearly defined metrics for security performance, incident response times, and breach notification.
  • Data Ownership and Residency: Clear definitions of data ownership, where data will be stored, and compliance with data sovereignty laws.
  • Right-to-Audit Clauses: The public sector entity’s right to conduct security audits of the vendor’s systems and processes.
  • Incident Response Requirements: Mandating vendor cooperation during security incidents, including forensic analysis and timely communication.
  • Security Requirements: Specific technical and organisational security measures the vendor must implement and maintain.
• Ongoing Monitoring and Assessment: VRM is not a one-time activity. It requires continuous monitoring of vendor security postures:
  • Security Ratings Services: Utilising third-party services that provide continuous, objective security ratings for vendors.
  • Periodic Re-assessments: Conducting regular (e.g., annual) security questionnaires and reviews.
  • Threat Intelligence Sharing: Establishing mechanisms for mutual threat intelligence sharing with key vendors.
• Supply Chain Mapping and Risk Assessment: For critical shared services, understanding the full supply chain – from the primary vendor to their sub-processors and software components – is essential. This helps identify and assess Nth party risks and dependencies (en.wikipedia.org).
• Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Requiring vendors to provide an SBOM for software components used in shared services increases transparency and helps identify potential vulnerabilities arising from open-source or third-party libraries.
• Clear Communication Channels: Establishing formal, secure channels for reporting and addressing security incidents, vulnerabilities, and changes in security posture with all vendors. This includes mechanisms for timely disclosure of known vulnerabilities in vendor products or services.

Effective VRM is a continuous, dynamic process that requires dedicated resources, expertise, and strong contractual leverage to ensure that the security of the shared public sector IT infrastructure is not undermined by external dependencies.

5.6 Security Governance and Policy Framework

Robust governance and a clear policy framework are paramount for managing the complexities and ambiguities of cybersecurity in shared public sector IT infrastructures. This establishes the ‘rules of the road’ for all participating entities.

• Unified Governance Framework: Developing a comprehensive governance framework that transcends individual agency boundaries. This framework should define roles, responsibilities, and decision-making authority for all aspects of shared IT security, potentially through a dedicated inter-agency cybersecurity committee or a central government cybersecurity authority.
• Clear Delineation of Responsibilities (RACI Matrix): Utilising tools like a RACI (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) matrix to explicitly define who is responsible for specific security tasks (e.g., incident response, patch management, access reviews) within the shared environment, differentiating between the central managing entity and individual participating agencies.
• Common Security Policies, Standards, and Guidelines: Establishing a mandatory, government-wide set of cybersecurity policies, standards, and guidelines that all agencies must adhere to. This ensures a consistent baseline security posture across the entire shared infrastructure. These should cover areas like data classification, access control, incident response, vulnerability management, and acceptable use.
• Funding Models and Resource Allocation: Developing transparent and equitable funding models for shared cybersecurity services, infrastructure upgrades, and staffing. This prevents underinvestment in critical security capabilities and ensures that the financial burden is appropriately distributed among beneficiaries.
• Legal and Regulatory Compliance: Harmonising diverse legal and regulatory compliance requirements across different agencies (e.g., privacy laws, data retention mandates, industry-specific regulations). The governance framework must ensure that the shared infrastructure meets the strictest applicable requirements, or provide mechanisms for isolated compliance where necessary.
• Regular Audits and Compliance Checks: Implementing a program of regular internal and external audits to ensure that all participating agencies and the central managing entity are adhering to the established security policies and standards. This includes technical compliance checks and process audits.
• Risk Management Framework: Establishing a common enterprise-wide risk management framework for the shared infrastructure, including methodologies for identifying, assessing, mitigating, and monitoring risks consistently across all agencies. This might align with frameworks like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (en.wikipedia.org).

Effective security governance provides the essential structural and procedural foundation for securing shared IT infrastructure, ensuring accountability and driving consistent security practices across the entire ecosystem.

5.7 Incident Response and Business Continuity Planning

Given the high potential for rapid breach propagation and widespread impact in shared IT infrastructures, highly coordinated incident response (IR) and robust business continuity (BC) planning are critical. These plans must extend across all participating agencies and the central managing entity.

• Coordinated Incident Response Plan: Developing a comprehensive IR plan specifically tailored for shared environments. This plan must define:
  • Roles and Responsibilities: Clear assignment of roles for detection, analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, and post-incident review across all relevant stakeholders.
  • Communication Protocols: Established channels and procedures for internal (between agencies, central entity, IT, legal, communications) and external (law enforcement, regulatory bodies, public) communication during an incident.
  • Containment Strategies: Specific procedures for isolating compromised systems or network segments without disrupting critical services for unaffected agencies.
  • Forensics Capabilities: Establishing shared forensic tools and expertise, or agreed-upon third-party forensic services, to investigate incidents across multi-tenant or multi-agency environments.
  • Playbooks: Pre-defined response playbooks for common incident types (e.g., ransomware, data breach, DoS attack) adapted for the shared environment.
• Simulations and Tabletop Exercises: Regularly conducting simulated incident response scenarios and tabletop exercises involving representatives from all participating agencies, IT teams, cybersecurity personnel, legal counsel, and communication teams. This helps test the plan’s effectiveness, identify gaps, and improve coordination under pressure.
• Data Backup and Recovery Strategies: Implementing robust, geographically distributed data backup and recovery solutions for all shared data and critical systems. Regular testing of these backups is essential to ensure data integrity and recoverability.
• Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans: Developing comprehensive BC/DR plans for critical shared services. These plans should identify essential functions, define recovery time objectives (RTOs) and recovery point objectives (RPOs), and outline strategies for service restoration in the event of a major outage or disaster, ensuring resilience across the public sector.
• Cyber Insurance: Exploring appropriate cyber insurance policies that cover the unique risks of shared public sector IT infrastructure, including potential liabilities for data breaches affecting multiple agencies.

A well-rehearsed and coordinated IR and BC plan can significantly minimise the damage and recovery time following a cybersecurity incident in a shared environment, preserving public trust and operational continuity.

5.8 Security Culture and Training

The human element remains a primary vulnerability, making a strong security culture and continuous training essential mitigation strategies for shared IT infrastructure. Addressing inconsistencies in human behaviour across disparate agencies is critical.

• Fostering a Unified Security Culture: Actively promoting a culture where cybersecurity is seen as a collective responsibility, not just an IT function. This involves leadership buy-in, clear communication from top management, and consistent messaging across all participating agencies.
• Mandatory and Continuous Cybersecurity Awareness Training: Implementing mandatory, engaging, and regularly updated cybersecurity awareness training for all users across the entire shared environment. This training should cover:
  • Phishing and social engineering recognition.
  • Strong password practices and MFA usage.
  • Data handling procedures and classification.
  • Reporting suspicious activities.
  • Specific risks related to shared services.
• Specialised Training for IT and Cybersecurity Staff: Providing advanced, role-specific training for IT professionals and cybersecurity personnel who manage and secure the shared infrastructure. This includes training on new security technologies, threat intelligence, incident response, and secure coding practices.
• Simulated Phishing Campaigns and Social Engineering Tests: Conducting regular, controlled phishing simulations and social engineering tests to evaluate the effectiveness of training and identify areas for improvement. This helps reinforce lessons learned in a practical way.
• Promoting a ‘See Something, Say Something’ Culture: Encouraging all employees to promptly report any suspicious activity or perceived security anomalies without fear of reprimand. Establishing clear, easy-to-use channels for reporting helps foster this proactive approach.
• Integration of Security into Onboarding: Ensuring that security awareness and best practices are a fundamental component of the onboarding process for all new employees joining any agency within the shared ecosystem.

By investing in people through continuous training and cultivating a unified, vigilant security culture, public sector entities can significantly reduce the risk of human-initiated breaches and transform their workforce into a robust line of defence for shared IT infrastructure.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

6. Conclusion

The integration of shared IT infrastructure across public sector entities represents a fundamental pillar of modern digital governance. It promises substantial benefits, including enhanced cost efficiency through economies of scale, streamlined resource optimisation, fostering unprecedented inter-agency collaboration, and simplifying management through standardisation. These advantages are crucial for governmental bodies striving to deliver more effective, responsive, and citizen-centric services in an era of increasing fiscal pressure and public demand for digital transformation.

However, this strategic imperative is intrinsically linked to a new paradigm of cybersecurity risks. The very interconnectedness that drives efficiency also creates an expanded and complex attack surface, amplifying the potential impact of vulnerabilities. The emergence of single points of failure, the potential for rapid breach propagation, the intricate web of vendor dependencies, and ambiguities in governance and accountability present formidable challenges that cannot be understated. Furthermore, the persistent burden of legacy systems and the critical human factor, often characterised by inconsistent training and varied security cultures across diverse agencies, add layers of complexity to an already challenging security landscape.

Effectively harnessing the benefits of shared IT infrastructure while rigorously mitigating its inherent cybersecurity risks demands a comprehensive and proactive strategic approach. This research has highlighted the critical importance of adopting cutting-edge security frameworks such as Zero Trust Architecture, which fundamentally shifts trust from implicitly assumed to explicitly verified. The implementation of granular network segmentation and micro-segmentation becomes indispensable for containing threats and limiting their lateral movement. Continuous security assessments, robust vulnerability management, and regular penetration testing are vital for proactive identification and remediation of weaknesses. Strong Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems, coupled with multi-factor authentication and privileged access management, are crucial for controlling who can access what, when, and from where.

Beyond technical controls, effective vendor risk management and comprehensive supply chain security are essential to manage external dependencies, while a robust security governance and policy framework provides the necessary structure and accountability across all participating entities. Lastly, coordinated incident response and business continuity planning, alongside a continuous investment in fostering a strong, unified security culture and providing ongoing cybersecurity awareness training, solidify the human element as a critical line of defence.

In essence, securing shared IT infrastructure in the public sector is not merely a technical exercise; it is a complex, continuous endeavour that requires strategic foresight, robust architectural design, meticulous implementation of advanced security controls, clear governance, sustained funding, and a collective commitment to cybersecurity at all levels of public administration. By embracing these holistic mitigation strategies, policymakers and IT leaders can ensure that the promise of efficient, collaborative, and resilient public services through shared IT infrastructure is fully realised, without compromising the trust and security of citizens and critical government operations.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

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