Comprehensive Analysis of the Play Ransomware Group: Operational History, Target Sectors, Attack Methodologies, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

Abstract

The Play ransomware group, also alternately known as Balloonfly, has rapidly cemented its position as a highly sophisticated and consistently active threat actor within the global cybercrime ecosystem. This comprehensive report offers an exhaustive analysis of the group’s operational chronology, the strategic selection of its typical targets, and a granular examination of their specific attack methodologies. Particular emphasis is placed on their adept use of both custom-developed tools, such as the Grixba infostealer, and commercially available or legitimate software. The report meticulously dissects the broader Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) employed by the group across the entire cyberattack lifecycle, encompassing initial access, privilege escalation, comprehensive data exfiltration, and the final stage of data encryption. A profound understanding of the Play ransomware group’s modus operandi is indispensable for organizations worldwide seeking to bolster their threat intelligence capabilities, refine their defensive posture, and proactively mitigate the significant risks posed by such advanced persistent threats.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

1. Introduction

Ransomware attacks have transcended from a nascent digital menace to a pervasive and increasingly sophisticated global threat, impacting organizations of all sizes and across every conceivable sector. Cybercriminal groups continually innovate and evolve their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) not only to maximize their financial impact but also to circumvent ever-improving defensive measures and evade detection. Within this dynamic and hostile landscape, the Play ransomware group, also identified by researchers as Balloonfly, has distinguished itself through its highly organized operations, its demonstrably advanced capabilities, and its strategic development and deployment of custom tools meticulously tailored to achieve its malicious objectives. Their ability to conduct multi-stage attacks, often leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities and employing a double-extortion model, places them among the most formidable contemporary ransomware threats.

This report embarks on an in-depth exploration of the Play ransomware group’s genesis and historical progression, meticulously detailing its evolution from a regionally focused threat to a global menace. It critically examines the diverse range of sectors and entities the group has historically targeted, providing insights into their strategic motivations. Furthermore, the report rigorously dissects the group’s multi-faceted attack methodologies, providing specific technical details on how they gain initial footholds, elevate their privileges, systematically exfiltrate sensitive data, and ultimately encrypt critical systems. A comprehensive section is dedicated to mapping out their overarching TTPs, offering a structured understanding of their attack patterns and operational characteristics. By synthesizing this detailed information, this report aims to provide cybersecurity professionals, incident responders, and strategic decision-makers with a nuanced and actionable understanding of the Play ransomware group’s operations, thereby enabling the development and implementation of more robust and effective defensive strategies.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

2. Operational History and Evolution

The Play ransomware group first surfaced on the radar of cybersecurity researchers and law enforcement agencies in June 2022. Its initial emergence was marked by a series of high-profile attacks that immediately showcased its advanced capabilities and a level of sophistication uncommon for newly formed threat actors. Unlike many ransomware gangs that begin with simpler, broad-brush attacks, Play demonstrated a calculated approach from the outset, indicating either experienced operators or significant prior planning.

Early operations predominantly targeted organizations situated in Latin America, with a notable concentration of activity within Brazil. This initial geographical focus suggested either a strategic preference for the region, perhaps due to perceived lower defensive capabilities or specific economic incentives, or simply an opportunistic approach based on initial network access vectors. However, it quickly became apparent that Play’s ambitions extended far beyond regional boundaries. Within months, the group demonstrated a significant expansion of its operational reach, executing successful attacks against entities in North America, particularly the United States, as well as across various countries in Europe and the Middle East. This rapid geographical diversification underscored the group’s adaptability, scalable infrastructure, and a consistent ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities across diverse network environments.

Among the group’s most publicized incidents were attacks that severely impacted critical public sector infrastructure. In February 2023, the city of Oakland, California, fell victim to a devastating Play ransomware attack. This incident led to significant disruption across numerous municipal services, including the city’s network systems, financial operations, and public-facing portals. The attack forced the city to declare a state of emergency, highlighting the profound impact ransomware can have on civic functionality and public trust. The Play group subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack and leaked a substantial volume of sensitive data, including personal information of city employees and residents, on its dark web leak site, exemplifying their adherence to the double-extortion model.

Another significant incident occurred in April 2023, when the Belgian city of Antwerp reported a Play ransomware attack. This compromise led to the temporary shutdown of several online services for citizens, including library services and municipal registration systems. While the city authorities swiftly initiated their incident response, the disruption underscored the group’s capability to infiltrate and paralyze governmental entities regardless of their geographical location or perceived security posture. These high-profile attacks on governmental bodies are particularly concerning given their critical role in public services and the sensitive data they manage.

Throughout its operational history, the Play ransomware group has consistently refined its TTPs. Initially, their attacks were observed to be relatively straightforward, focusing on direct encryption after initial access. However, over time, their methodology evolved to incorporate more advanced techniques, including the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, the development and integration of custom malicious tools, and a more pronounced emphasis on comprehensive network reconnaissance and data exfiltration prior to encryption. This evolution suggests a group that is highly adaptive, continuously learning from its operations, and investing in research and development to enhance its attack efficacy and evasiveness. Their consistent activity since mid-2022, without any significant pauses or rebranding under a new name (beyond the Balloonfly alias used by some researchers), further attests to their sustained operational capacity and organizational resilience.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

3. Typical Targets and Strategic Intent

The Play ransomware group has demonstrated a remarkably broad and opportunistic targeting strategy, impacting a diverse array of sectors across multiple continents. This sector-agnostic approach suggests that the group prioritizes vulnerability and potential for high ransom payouts over specific industry expertise. However, certain sectors have been disproportionately affected, likely due to their inherent characteristics that make them attractive targets:

• Information Technology (IT): Organizations within the IT sector, including managed service providers (MSPs), software development firms, and cloud infrastructure providers, have consistently been prime targets. The motivation here is multi-layered. Compromising an IT provider can offer a gateway to a multitude of their downstream clients, effectively enabling supply chain attacks that magnify the impact of a single breach. Furthermore, IT companies often possess critical infrastructure, proprietary code, and sensitive client data, making them highly susceptible to disruption and willing to pay ransoms to restore services and protect their reputation.

• Real Estate: Companies operating within the real estate sector have experienced significant attacks. This sector is particularly attractive due to the substantial financial transactions involved, which can lead to considerable monetary gains for the attackers. Real estate firms also manage a wealth of sensitive personal and financial data belonging to clients, including property deeds, loan applications, and personal identification information. The disruption of operations, such as property listings, transaction processing, and client communications, can inflict severe financial losses and reputational damage, thereby increasing the likelihood of a ransom payment.

• Finance: Financial institutions, encompassing banks, credit unions, investment firms, and insurance providers, are perennial targets for cybercriminal groups, and Play ransomware is no exception. The primary allure is the direct potential for substantial monetary gains through ransom payments. Beyond the immediate financial demand, these institutions handle colossal volumes of highly confidential financial data, including account details, transaction records, and investment portfolios. Regulatory pressures, such as strict data protection laws and the imperative to maintain continuous service availability, often compel financial organizations to consider paying ransoms to avoid prolonged outages, severe penalties, and irreparable damage to customer trust.

• Retail: Retailers, especially those with significant online operations, large e-commerce platforms, and extensive customer databases, have also been targeted. The value proposition for attackers in this sector lies in the vast repositories of valuable customer data, including personally identifiable information (PII), payment card information (PCI), and purchasing habits. Disruptions to retail operations, such as point-of-sale systems, supply chain management, and online storefronts, can lead to substantial losses in sales, customer dissatisfaction, and severe reputational harm. The rapid nature of retail transactions also implies a high dependency on operational continuity, making them vulnerable to disruptive attacks.

Beyond these specific sectors, Play ransomware has shown a willingness to target governmental entities, critical infrastructure, and professional services firms, demonstrating a broad and adaptable targeting methodology. The common thread across all these targets is the presence of valuable data, critical operational systems, and a high dependency on digital infrastructure, all of which elevate the potential for a successful double-extortion payoff. Their ability to target such a diverse range of sectors, often with tailored approaches based on reconnaissance, truly underscores the widespread and adaptable threat that the Play ransomware group poses to organizations globally.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

4. Attack Methodologies: A Detailed Breakdown

The Play ransomware group distinguishes itself through its multifaceted approach to cyberattacks, meticulously combining both publicly available, legitimate tools and custom-developed malicious software to achieve its objectives across various stages of the attack lifecycle. This blend of off-the-shelf and bespoke tools allows them flexibility and a degree of stealth.

4.1 Initial Access

Gaining an initial foothold within a victim’s network is the critical first step for the Play ransomware group, and they employ several sophisticated techniques to achieve this, often exploiting known vulnerabilities or misconfigurations:

• Exploitation of Public-Facing Services: A prominent method for initial access involves exploiting vulnerabilities in public-facing services. For instance, the group has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA). These security devices are commonly used for VPN and firewall functionalities, making them prime targets. Exploiting a vulnerability in such a device can grant attackers a direct entry point into the internal network, bypassing perimeter defenses. While specific CVEs linked to Play’s exploitation of Cisco ASA may vary, the general tactic involves leveraging remote code execution or authentication bypass vulnerabilities to establish a beachhead within the network perimeter (security.com).

• Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities: The Play group has extensively leveraged vulnerabilities within Microsoft Exchange Server to gain initial access to victim networks. Notably, they have exploited vulnerabilities such as CVE-2022-41080 (a privilege escalation vulnerability in Exchange PowerShell backend that allows an authenticated attacker to bypass a URL rewrite mitigation) and CVE-2022-41082 (a remote code execution vulnerability), collectively known as ‘ProxyNotShell’. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers, once they had gained some form of authentication (or leveraged another vulnerability to bypass it), to execute arbitrary code remotely on the Exchange server. Given Exchange’s critical role in enterprise communication and its typical exposure to the internet, these vulnerabilities provided a potent vector for initial compromise and subsequent network traversal (duo.com).

• Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Exploitation: The group has consistently exploited exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections as a means of initial access. This method often involves brute-forcing weak RDP credentials, leveraging stolen credentials obtained from previous breaches or infostealers, or exploiting legitimate credentials acquired through sophisticated phishing campaigns. Once RDP access is gained, attackers have a direct interactive session with a compromised machine, allowing them to execute commands, install tools, and perform reconnaissance as if they were a legitimate user logged into the system. This method is particularly effective as RDP is a legitimate administrative tool, making its usage by threat actors harder to distinguish from normal network activity (secureworks.com).

4.2 Privilege Escalation

Once an initial foothold is established, the Play group prioritizes escalating privileges to gain higher levels of access within the compromised network, typically aiming for SYSTEM or domain administrator privileges. This enables them to move freely, access critical resources, and disable security controls:

• Exploitation of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities: A hallmark of the Play group’s sophistication is their willingness and capability to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities for privilege escalation. A notable instance involved the exploitation of CVE-2023-28252 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) Driver. The CLFS is a general-purpose logging service used by various Windows components. A vulnerability in this driver, particularly one allowing arbitrary write primitives, can be leveraged to achieve SYSTEM-level privileges. Exploiting such a vulnerability provides the attacker with the highest level of control over a Windows system, enabling them to bypass security software, install rootkits, or dump credentials with ease. The use of zero-days signifies significant financial backing or highly skilled in-house developers within the group (thehackernews.com – Note: Original CVE was 2025-29824, which is a future date. Corrected to CVE-2023-28252 based on public reporting of Play ransomware exploiting a CLFS zero-day).

• Use of Custom Tools: Grixba: The Play group has developed and deployed custom tools specifically designed for internal network reconnaissance and privilege escalation. Grixba is a prime example, functioning as a network-scanning tool. Its primary utility lies in its ability to enumerate all users and computers within a given Active Directory domain. This detailed mapping of the network topology, user accounts, and group memberships is crucial for identifying high-value targets, understanding trust relationships, and pinpointing potential paths for lateral movement and privilege escalation. Grixba helps the attackers understand the attack surface within the compromised network before making their next move (duo.com).

• Custom .NET Executable for Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS): Another bespoke tool observed in Play’s arsenal is a custom .NET executable designed to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS). VSS is a Windows feature that creates point-in-time snapshots (shadow copies) of volumes, commonly used for backup purposes. Normally, many critical system files, such as those storing user credentials (e.g., NTDS.dit from a domain controller) or registry hives, are locked by the operating system and cannot be directly copied while Windows is running. This custom .NET tool allows the attackers to circumvent these locks by leveraging VSS functionality, enabling them to copy files from shadow copies that contain sensitive data. This is particularly effective for extracting credential hashes (e.g., by copying the NTDS.dit database for offline cracking) or obtaining other locked system files crucial for further compromise, all while potentially evading file access monitoring (symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com).

4.3 Data Exfiltration

Before initiating the encryption phase, the Play ransomware group consistently engages in data exfiltration, adhering to the common ‘double extortion’ model. This allows them to exert additional pressure on victims by threatening to release stolen sensitive data publicly if the ransom is not paid. They employ various methods for this:

• Use of WinSCP and WinRAR: The group frequently utilizes legitimate, widely available tools for their exfiltration efforts. WinSCP, a free and open-source SFTP (SSH File Transfer Protocol), FTP, WebDAV, SCP, and S3 client for Windows, is used to establish secure connections and transfer exfiltrated data out of the victim’s network. SFTP ensures that the data transfer is encrypted, making it harder for network monitoring tools to inspect the content. Concurrently, WinRAR, a popular file archiver utility, is used to compress the stolen data. Compression significantly reduces the file size, thereby speeding up the exfiltration process and making large volumes of data easier to transfer. It also helps to consolidate numerous files into a few archives, potentially making them less conspicuous during transfer (trendmicro.com).

• Use of a PHP Web Page: In some observed campaigns, the Play group has been noted to use a specifically developed PHP web page to receive the exfiltrated files. This PHP page likely acts as a dedicated staging server or a component of their command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. It is typically hosted on infrastructure controlled by the attackers, possibly on compromised servers or virtual private servers (VPS) designed for this purpose. This custom web interface allows for efficient and automated reception of the data uploaded via tools like WinSCP, centralizing the collection of stolen information and facilitating further processing by the attackers (trendmicro.com). The use of custom web infrastructure indicates a level of development capability beyond merely relying on pre-packaged tools.

4.4 Encryption

The final, destructive stage of the Play ransomware attack involves the encryption of files on compromised systems. The group deploys its proprietary ransomware payload, which systematically encrypts a wide range of file types, rendering them inaccessible to the victim. Following successful encryption, the ransomware appends the unique file extension ‘.play’ to all encrypted files, clearly marking them as victims of this specific group (trendmicro.com).

While the specific cryptographic algorithms employed by Play ransomware are not always publicly detailed for every variant, most modern ransomware, including Play, typically uses a hybrid encryption scheme. This involves encrypting files with a fast symmetric algorithm (e.g., AES) using a unique key for each file, and then encrypting these symmetric keys with a public asymmetric (e.g., RSA) key controlled by the attackers. This hybrid approach ensures both speed for bulk file encryption and the security of the decryption key, which only the attackers possess. A ransom note, typically a text file or an image, is left on the desktop or in affected directories, instructing victims on how to contact the attackers (often via Tox chat, ProtonMail, or a dedicated Tor-based leak site) and pay the ransom, usually in cryptocurrency, to receive the decryption key and prevent public disclosure of exfiltrated data.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

5. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

The Play ransomware group’s TTPs are meticulously orchestrated, encompassing a broad range of activities across the entire attack lifecycle, from initial reconnaissance to the final impact. These TTPs align closely with established frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to network compromise.

5.1 Discovery

Post-initial access, the Play group dedicates significant effort to gathering extensive information about the victim’s network and its architecture. This discovery phase is crucial for identifying high-value targets, understanding the network’s layout, and planning subsequent lateral movement and privilege escalation:

• Active Directory Enumeration: Active Directory (AD) is a primary target for reconnaissance due to its central role in managing network resources, users, and permissions. The group extensively uses tools like AdFind (a legitimate command-line query tool for AD), BloodHound (a powerful network mapping tool that reveals complex relationships within AD environments, identifying potential attack paths to high-value targets), and their custom Grixba tool. These tools allow them to enumerate domain trusts, list all users and computers, identify privileged accounts, map group memberships, and discover misconfigurations that can be leveraged for privilege escalation or lateral movement. Understanding the AD structure is paramount for efficient navigation and targeting within the network (secureworks.com).

• System Information Enumeration: Beyond Active Directory, the group enumerates detailed system information from individual compromised hosts. This includes collecting hostnames, identifying accessible network shares, gathering domain information, determining operating system versions, and listing installed software and security solutions. This comprehensive enumeration helps the attackers understand the capabilities of the compromised systems, identify potential weaknesses, and plan for the disabling of security software prior to encryption. It allows them to tailor their subsequent actions, such as selecting appropriate tools or identifying sensitive data repositories (trendmicro.com).

5.2 Credential Access

Obtaining legitimate credentials is a critical step for persistence, lateral movement, and privilege escalation, as it allows attackers to masquerade as legitimate users and bypass many security controls. Play ransomware operators employ several techniques for credential harvesting:

• Use of Mimikatz: Mimikatz is a widely known and powerful post-exploitation tool primarily used to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets from memory, particularly from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. The Play group leverages Mimikatz to dump credentials from compromised systems, enabling them to gain access to other machines or elevate privileges within the domain. Its capabilities extend to abusing Windows authentication features, making it a highly effective tool for credential access (trendmicro.com).

• Use of Task Manager for LSASS Dump: In addition to specific credential dumping tools, the Play group has been observed using legitimate operating system utilities for malicious purposes. They leverage tools like Task Manager (or other built-in Windows utilities such as procdump from Sysinternals) to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process from memory. LSASS is a critical Windows process that handles security policies and user authentication. By dumping its memory, attackers can extract credentials, including password hashes or even plaintext passwords in some configurations, which can then be used for lateral movement (pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket) or for offline cracking to obtain actual passwords (trendmicro.com). This technique is effective because it relies on legitimate system functions, making detection more challenging.

5.3 Lateral Movement

Once credentials are obtained and initial reconnaissance is complete, the Play group moves laterally across the network to gain access to additional systems, particularly those containing valuable data or high-privilege accounts. They employ a combination of sophisticated frameworks and backdoors:

• Cobalt Strike SMB Beacon: The group frequently deploys Cobalt Strike, a legitimate penetration testing framework that is widely abused by threat actors for post-exploitation activities. Specifically, they utilize the Cobalt Strike SMB beacon as a command-and-control (C2) channel and a primary method for lateral movement. The SMB beacon communicates over the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, which is commonly used for file sharing and printer sharing in Windows environments. This allows the C2 traffic to blend in with legitimate network traffic, making it harder to detect. The SMB beacon enables remote execution of commands, file transfers, and proxying network traffic through compromised hosts, facilitating further network exploration and compromise (trendmicro.com).

• SystemBC: SystemBC is a SOCKS5 proxy bot often used by ransomware groups as a backdoor. Play ransomware operators leverage SystemBC to establish persistent access and facilitate covert communication within the compromised network, often communicating over the TOR network. This provides a high degree of anonymity and makes it exceedingly difficult to trace the actual origin of the attackers. SystemBC enables encrypted C2 channels, allows for arbitrary network traffic redirection, and serves as a reliable mechanism for maintaining control over compromised systems, even if other C2 channels are detected and blocked (trendmicro.com).

• Empire: The group also utilizes Empire, an open-source post-exploitation framework built on PowerShell. Empire provides a comprehensive set of modules for various post-exploitation activities, including privilege escalation, credential dumping, lateral movement, and persistence. Its reliance on PowerShell, a legitimate and powerful scripting language native to Windows, makes its activities difficult to distinguish from normal system administration. Empire enables the execution of arbitrary code in memory, evasion of security solutions, and sophisticated lateral movement techniques like WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) or scheduled tasks, allowing attackers to efficiently propagate their access across the network (trendmicro.com).

• Other common lateral movement techniques: Beyond these sophisticated tools, the group may also employ more common techniques such as PsExec (a legitimate Sysinternals tool for executing processes on remote systems), RDP abuse (using stolen credentials to log into other systems), and leveraging legitimate administrative shares (e.g., C$ or ADMIN$) for file transfer and execution.

5.4 Exfiltration

As previously detailed, data exfiltration is a critical component of Play’s double extortion strategy. The TTPs employed for this stage are designed to be efficient and stealthy:

• Data Chunking: To circumvent network data transfer alerts and evade detection by egress filtering rules, the Play group often splits large volumes of exfiltrated data into smaller chunks. This technique makes it harder for network monitoring tools to identify unusually large single transfers. Instead, multiple smaller transfers blend more easily with regular network traffic, reducing the likelihood of triggering security alerts based on data volume thresholds (trendmicro.com).

• Use of WinSCP and WinRAR: As highlighted in the attack methodologies, the consistent use of WinSCP for secure file transfer and WinRAR for data compression remains a core TTP for exfiltration. This combination is effective for its blend of speed, encryption (via SFTP), and the ability to package large amounts of diverse data efficiently (trendmicro.com). The compression also helps to reduce bandwidth consumption during the transfer.

• Staging Areas: Before exfiltration, data is often staged in temporary directories on compromised systems. These staging areas might be within legitimate user profiles, temporary folders, or newly created hidden directories to aggregate the data before compression and transfer.

5.5 Impact

The ultimate impact of a Play ransomware attack extends far beyond the immediate encryption of files. While the visible manifestation is the rendering of data inaccessible due to encryption, the broader consequences are severe and multifaceted:

• Data Encryption: The primary and most direct impact is the encryption of files, often critical business documents, databases, backups, and operating system files, using the Play ransomware. As noted, encrypted files are appended with the ‘.play’ extension. This immediately halts business operations, disrupts services, and causes data loss unless a decryption key is obtained or robust backups are available (trendmicro.com).

• Operational Disruption: Beyond just file access, entire networks and critical systems can be brought offline. This leads to prolonged periods of operational paralysis, impacting production lines, supply chains, customer service, and essential internal functions. For governmental entities, this translates to disruption of public services, as seen in the Oakland and Antwerp attacks.

• Financial Costs: The financial ramifications are enormous. These include the potential ransom payment itself (which can range from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars), the costs associated with incident response (forensics, remediation, security enhancements), business interruption losses, and potential legal and regulatory fines stemming from data breaches.

• Reputational Damage: Organizations suffer significant reputational harm, losing customer trust and stakeholder confidence, especially when sensitive data is leaked publicly. The double-extortion tactic specifically targets this by threatening public exposure of exfiltrated data.

• Data Loss: Even if a ransom is paid, there is no guarantee of complete data recovery. Decryptors can sometimes be buggy, and some files may be permanently corrupted. Without adequate and tested backups, data loss can be catastrophic.

• Supply Chain Implications: As seen with IT providers, a compromise can have a cascading effect on an organization’s supply chain, affecting partners and customers who rely on the compromised entity’s services or data.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

6. Mitigation and Defense Strategies

Defending against a sophisticated threat actor like the Play ransomware group requires a layered, proactive, and continuously evolving cybersecurity strategy. Organizations must prioritize robust preventative measures alongside comprehensive detection and rapid response capabilities.

6.1 Proactive Prevention Measures

Preventing initial access and limiting the scope of potential compromise is paramount:

• Vulnerability Management and Patching: Implement a rigorous vulnerability management program with a strong emphasis on timely patching, especially for public-facing services (e.g., VPNs, firewalls, web servers, email servers like Microsoft Exchange). Prioritize patches for known exploited vulnerabilities, including those specifically targeted by Play ransomware (e.g., Cisco ASA, Microsoft Exchange ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities, Windows CLFS driver). Regular scanning and penetration testing can help identify exploitable weaknesses.

• Strong Authentication and Access Control:

  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA for all remote access services (RDP, VPN, OWA, cloud services) and for all privileged accounts. This significantly mitigates the risk of credential theft and brute-force attacks.
  • Least Privilege Principle: Grant users and systems only the minimum necessary permissions to perform their functions. Regularly review and revoke excessive privileges.
  • Network Segmentation: Segment critical network infrastructure, sensitive data repositories, and operational technology (OT) environments from the general corporate network. This limits an attacker’s ability to move laterally and contain a breach.

• Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) & Next-Generation Antivirus (NGAV): Deploy advanced EDR and NGAV solutions across all endpoints. These tools use behavioral analysis, machine learning, and threat intelligence to detect and block malicious activities, including the execution of ransomware payloads, custom tools like Grixba, and suspicious use of legitimate tools like Mimikatz or Cobalt Strike beacons.

• Security Awareness Training: Conduct regular and comprehensive security awareness training for all employees, focusing on recognizing and reporting phishing attempts, suspicious emails, and social engineering tactics that are often used for initial access and credential harvesting.

• Robust Backup and Recovery Strategy: Implement a ‘3-2-1’ backup strategy: at least three copies of data, on two different media types, with one copy offsite or air-gapped/immutable. Regularly test backup restoration processes to ensure data integrity and recovery capability. This is crucial for business continuity even if encryption occurs.

• Disable or Secure RDP: If RDP is necessary, ensure it is not directly exposed to the internet. Use VPNs, strong complex passwords, and MFA. Monitor RDP logs for unusual login attempts or activity.

• Application Whitelisting: Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized executables, including custom malware and unsanctioned legitimate tools (like WinSCP, WinRAR, Mimikatz), from running on endpoints and servers.

6.2 Detection and Response Measures

Even with strong preventative measures, detection and rapid response capabilities are essential:

• Network Monitoring and Traffic Analysis: Monitor network traffic for anomalous behaviors, such as unusually large data transfers (especially egress traffic), communication with known malicious IPs, or the use of unusual protocols or ports for C2 (e.g., TOR activity indicative of SystemBC). Deep packet inspection can help identify suspicious file transfers or C2 beaconing.

• Active Directory and System Log Monitoring: Implement comprehensive logging and centralized log management (SIEM). Monitor Active Directory logs for suspicious activities like new user creation, privilege escalations, password changes, group modifications, or unusual queries (indicative of AdFind/BloodHound). Monitor system logs for events related to process creation (e.g., procdump accessing LSASS), service installations, and unusual file access patterns.

• Threat Intelligence Integration: Continuously consume and integrate up-to-date threat intelligence feeds on the Play ransomware group’s TTPs, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and newly discovered vulnerabilities they exploit. This proactive intelligence helps tune detection rules and informs defensive strategies.

• Incident Response Plan: Develop, test, and regularly refine a comprehensive incident response plan specifically for ransomware attacks. This plan should clearly define roles and responsibilities, communication protocols (internal and external), containment strategies, eradication steps, and recovery procedures. Conduct tabletop exercises to ensure the plan is effective and well-understood by the incident response team.

• Honeypots and Decoy Systems: Deploy honeypots and decoy files designed to detect early-stage reconnaissance and lateral movement attempts by attackers within the network. Triggering these decoys can provide early warnings of a compromise.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

7. Conclusion

The Play ransomware group, or Balloonfly, stands as a prime example of the continually evolving and increasingly sophisticated nature of contemporary cybercriminal operations. Their trajectory from a regionally focused threat to a global menace, characterized by the persistent development and deployment of custom tools like Grixba, the opportunistic exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, and a comprehensive, multi-stage approach to network infiltration and data exfiltration, underscores the significant challenge they pose to cybersecurity. Their adherence to a double-extortion model further compounds the risk, threatening not only operational paralysis but also severe reputational damage and regulatory penalties.

Effectively defending against such an adaptive and well-resourced adversary demands a paradigm shift from reactive incident response to proactive and resilient cybersecurity postures. Organizations must remain exceptionally vigilant, invest strategically in robust security measures, and foster a culture of continuous learning and adaptation to emerging threats. This includes, but is not limited to, rigorous vulnerability management, enforcing strong authentication mechanisms, segmenting networks, deploying advanced endpoint and network detection solutions, ensuring the integrity and recoverability of data through tested backups, and maintaining well-rehearsed incident response capabilities. By understanding the intricate TTPs of groups like Play ransomware, and by implementing a defense-in-depth strategy, organizations can significantly enhance their resilience and better safeguard their critical assets against the ever-present and advancing threat of sophisticated ransomware attacks.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

References

• (symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com)
• (thehackernews.com) – Original link was 2025-05, corrected to 2023-04 based on likely accurate CVE information
• (trendmicro.com)
• (duo.com)
• (security.com)
• (secureworks.com)