The Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP): A Comprehensive Analysis of the UK’s Post-Conflict Commitment

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

Abstract

The withdrawal of international military forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 profoundly altered the geopolitical landscape and posed immediate humanitarian challenges. In response, the United Kingdom established the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) to facilitate the relocation and resettlement of Afghan nationals who had provided crucial support to British military and diplomatic efforts during the two-decade-long conflict. This extensive research paper provides a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of ARAP, examining its historical antecedents, its detailed operational history from inception to announced closure, and the intricate eligibility criteria that governed its application. Furthermore, it meticulously dissects the multifaceted implementation challenges encountered, including bureaucratic bottlenecks, data security failures, and the logistical complexities of accessing application pathways. The paper quantifies the outcomes, presenting detailed statistics on the number of individuals successfully relocated and discussing the subsequent integration and resettlement efforts within the UK. Critically, it also addresses the ongoing needs of those still seeking assistance, explores the legal and parliamentary scrutiny faced by the policy, and offers a rigorous comparative analysis with similar relocation programs initiated by other nations, such as the United States, Canada, and Germany. By exploring these diverse aspects, this paper aims to provide a granular understanding of ARAP’s effectiveness, its profound humanitarian impact on thousands of lives, its role in upholding the UK’s international commitments, and the crucial lessons that can be derived for future large-scale humanitarian and displacement responses in complex post-conflict environments.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

1. Introduction

The abrupt and rapid withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, culminating in the swift collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, precipitated an immediate and profound humanitarian crisis. For nations like the United Kingdom, which had maintained a significant military and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan for nearly two decades, this critical juncture brought to the fore a compelling moral and ethical imperative: to safeguard the Afghan nationals who had directly assisted British forces and diplomatic missions. These individuals, including interpreters, cultural advisors, security guards, and other locally employed staff, faced acute and often life-threatening risks due to their association with foreign powers. Their contributions were indispensable to the success of UK operations, spanning intelligence gathering, operational effectiveness, and cultural mediation.

In recognition of this profound obligation, the United Kingdom government introduced the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP). Launched in April 2021, ahead of the final withdrawal, ARAP was designed as a bespoke mechanism to provide a pathway to safety and new lives in the UK for those deemed most at risk. This policy was framed not merely as an immigration scheme but as a solemn commitment to individuals who had demonstrated unwavering loyalty and courage in supporting British efforts, often at immense personal peril and to the detriment of their own safety and that of their families. The policy was intended to underscore the UK’s commitment to its allies and to ensure that trust, a cornerstone of international military cooperation, was upheld.

This paper delves deeply into the operational history of ARAP, tracing its evolution from its initial conceptualisation and the establishment of its objectives through its various implementation phases, including the chaotic emergency evacuation of Operation Pitting. It meticulously details the stringent eligibility criteria designed to identify and prioritise those most deserving of assistance. Crucially, the paper provides an exhaustive examination of the significant challenges that plagued ARAP’s implementation, ranging from bureaucratic inefficiencies and profound processing delays to critical data security breaches that endangered applicants, alongside the immense logistical and procedural hurdles faced by those attempting to access the scheme from within a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It further quantifies the tangible outcomes of ARAP, presenting statistics on the successful relocation of thousands of Afghans to the UK and discussing the subsequent complexities of their integration into British society. Moreover, the paper addresses the ongoing plight of individuals still seeking assistance, highlighting the legal and parliamentary oversight that has scrutinised ARAP’s efficacy. Finally, it offers a rigorous comparative analysis with similar relocation programs initiated by key international partners, including the United States, Canada, and Germany, drawing parallels and distinctions that illuminate the broader international response to the Afghan crisis and derive vital lessons for future humanitarian interventions and resettlement initiatives.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

2. Operational History of ARAP: Evolution and Implementation

The operational history of the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy is multifaceted, reflecting the dynamic and often tumultuous events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Its establishment was not an isolated event but built upon preceding commitments and evolved significantly as the security situation deteriorated.

2.1. Precursor Schemes and the Genesis of ARAP

Before ARAP’s formal launch, the United Kingdom had already implemented a policy to assist Afghan nationals who had worked alongside British forces: the Afghan Locally Employed Staff (LES) Ex-Gratia Scheme (EGS). Introduced in 2012, the EGS was designed to offer relocation to the UK to Afghan interpreters and other locally employed staff who had worked on the frontline in Helmand Province during the most intense periods of combat operations. To be eligible, individuals had to have served for a minimum of 12 months in a frontline role after 2006, and their role must have been deemed to have exposed them to a ‘significant threat’ [National Audit Office, 2015]. However, the EGS was perceived by many as overly restrictive, particularly concerning its narrow eligibility criteria and the limited number of beneficiaries it ultimately supported. It was criticised for its static nature, failing to adapt to the evolving security landscape and the broadening categories of Afghan staff who had rendered invaluable support to the UK effort beyond frontline interpreters.

The shortcomings of the EGS, coupled with mounting political pressure and a growing understanding of the imminent danger facing all categories of Afghan personnel as the international withdrawal accelerated, necessitated a more comprehensive and flexible policy. ARAP was conceived to address these limitations, signalling a broader and more proactive commitment by the UK government. Its establishment in April 2021, just months before the fall of Kabul, was a clear acknowledgement of the deteriorating security situation and the urgent need to provide a robust framework for relocation. The policy’s primary objective was explicitly stated: to acknowledge the extraordinary service and sacrifices made by Afghan staff and their families who had directly supported UK operations, thereby fulfilling a ‘moral obligation’ [UK Government, 2021]. This commitment was not merely humanitarian but also strategic, aimed at preserving the UK’s reputation as a reliable international partner and ensuring that future local collaborations in conflict zones would not be undermined by a perceived abandonment of allies.

2.2. Implementation Phases: From Emergency Evacuation to Structured Processing

The implementation of ARAP can be broadly categorised into distinct, albeit overlapping, phases, each presenting unique challenges and requiring different operational responses:

• Phase 1: Initial Emergency Evacuation (Operation Pitting)
  The most intense and visible phase of ARAP’s initial implementation was inextricably linked with Operation Pitting, the emergency military evacuation conducted from Kabul Airport in August 2021. Following the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s swift takeover of the capital, the UK, alongside other allied nations, launched a highly complex and perilous airlift operation. Between 13 and 28 August 2021, over 15,000 individuals were airlifted to safety from Kabul. This monumental effort involved the Royal Air Force, elements of the British Army, and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) diplomatic staff operating under extreme duress in a rapidly deteriorating security environment [Wikipedia, Operation Pitting].

  Of the approximately 15,000 evacuees, over 5,000 were British nationals and their families, while the vast majority – more than 8,000 Afghan nationals – were eligible under ARAP, along with a significant number of at-risk Afghans who qualified under the newly established Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS). The scene at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport was chaotic, marked by massive crowds, desperate attempts to board flights, and constant security threats, including a devastating suicide bombing outside Abbey Gate on 26 August that claimed over 170 lives, including 11 US Marines, a US Navy corpsman, and a US Army soldier, along with numerous Afghan civilians [CNN, 2021]. Despite these immense challenges, Operation Pitting represented a rapid and large-scale humanitarian airlift, driven by the immediate threat to life and the urgent need to extricate eligible individuals. Its primary focus was on emergency extraction rather than detailed eligibility processing, often relying on rudimentary checks due to the exigency of the situation.

• Phase 2: Post-Evacuation and Expansion of ARAP
  Following the conclusion of Operation Pitting and the complete withdrawal of UK forces from Afghanistan, ARAP transitioned from an emergency evacuation posture to a more structured, albeit still challenging, application and processing phase. This phase aimed to process applications from those eligible individuals who had not been evacuated during the August airlift, either because they could not reach Kabul Airport, were unaware of the scheme, or had their applications pending. The policy was expanded to encompass a broader range of individuals who had supported UK operations, extending beyond frontline interpreters to include those employed directly by the UK government (e.g., FCDO staff) and contractors in various support roles that had exposed them to risk [UK Parliament, 2021].

  During this phase, dedicated ARAP processing teams were established within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Home Office, tasked with reviewing applications, verifying employment records, assessing threat levels, and coordinating relocation. However, a significant operational hurdle emerged immediately: with no diplomatic presence or safe passage routes within Afghanistan, eligible applicants were required to reach a third country to access a UK Visa Application Centre (VAC) for biometric enrolment and final processing. This requirement inadvertently created new layers of risk and difficulty for applicants still in Afghanistan, forcing many to embark on perilous journeys to neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Iran, or others in the region [Migration Observatory, 2022].

• Phase 3: Ongoing Processing and Challenges of Access
  The period from late 2021 through to 2025 was characterised by the arduous ongoing processing of applications and the persistent challenges of access. While the UK government committed to continue processing eligible applications, the lack of a safe and legal pathway out of Afghanistan remained a critical barrier. Applicants faced immense difficulties in securing visas for third countries, often encountering high costs, extensive delays, and a lack of clear guidance. Many resorted to irregular routes, making them vulnerable to human traffickers, exploitation, and further danger [Human Rights Watch, 2022].

  The logistical complexities of processing applications from individuals scattered across Afghanistan and various transit countries placed immense strain on the ARAP teams. Verification of past employment, particularly for those whose records may have been lost or destroyed in the chaos of the Taliban takeover, proved exceptionally difficult. This phase also saw increasing scrutiny from parliamentary committees, human rights organisations, and the media regarding the slow pace of processing and the plight of those ‘left behind’.

• Phase 4: Closure of New ARAP Applications and Future Outlook
  In July 2025, the UK government announced the formal closure of new applications to the ARAP scheme, effective from that date [Financial Times, 2025]. The rationale provided for this decision was that the ‘vast majority’ of recent ARAP applications were deemed ineligible, and that the UK had fulfilled its commitment to those who had directly supported British operations. While new applications ceased, the government affirmed its commitment to continue processing applications that had been submitted prior to the closure date and were still awaiting a decision. This distinction was crucial, as it meant that individuals already in the pipeline would still be considered, but no new cases would be accepted.

  The closure of ARAP was met with mixed reactions. While the government highlighted the significant number of individuals successfully relocated (over 34,000 as of the announcement), critics argued that many eligible Afghans remained in peril, unable to access the scheme due to ongoing challenges. The decision prompted concerns about the moral implications of closing a lifeline for individuals still facing threats, particularly given the enduring lack of safe and legal routes out of Afghanistan. The closure placed greater emphasis on other existing, but often more restrictive, routes such as the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS) and the Family Reunion rules, leaving a complex and uncertain future for many who continue to seek safety in the UK.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

3. Eligibility Criteria and Assessment Process

The rigorous definition of eligibility under ARAP was central to its operation, designed to ensure that the policy targeted those Afghan nationals who had a direct and significant connection to the UK’s mission and were consequently at heightened risk. Understanding these criteria, and the process by which they were assessed, is crucial to evaluating the scheme’s effectiveness and its inherent limitations.

3.1. Core Eligibility Criteria

ARAP was specifically tailored for Afghan citizens and their eligible family members. The principal applicant had to demonstrate a direct and meaningful connection to the UK government’s mission in Afghanistan. The key criteria, refined over time, were broadly defined as follows:

• Employment with UK Forces, Ministry of Defence (MOD), or Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO): This criterion covered individuals who were directly employed by the UK MOD or FCDO in Afghanistan on or after 1 October 2001 (not 2021 as stated in the original article, as this was the start of UK operations post-9/11) [UK Government, 2021]. This included a wide range of roles beyond just interpreters, such as administrative staff, drivers, cooks, and security personnel who worked within British bases or diplomatic compounds. The emphasis was on direct employment by the UK government rather than through third-party contractors in certain instances.

• Contracted Linguistic Services for UK Armed Forces: This category specifically targeted interpreters and cultural advisors who were contracted to provide linguistic and cultural mediation services for the UK’s Armed Forces. These individuals often operated on the front lines alongside British troops, making them exceptionally vulnerable due to their intimate knowledge of UK operations and their direct association with the military. Their roles were often critical for operational success, information gathering, and fostering relationships with local communities [The Guardian, 2021].

• Affiliation with UK Government Departments in Afghanistan: This broader category encompassed individuals who had worked with other UK government departments, agencies, or closely affiliated organisations (e.g., contractors performing essential services directly for the UK government) that were integral to the UK’s mission in Afghanistan. The key determinant was the direct and significant contribution to the UK government’s efforts and the resultant risk faced by the individual. For all categories, the individual’s role had to be deemed to have exposed them to a ‘serious and imminent threat to life’ due to their support for the UK [UK Government, 2021]. This threat assessment was central to an application’s success.

3.2. Assessment and Verification Process

The assessment process for ARAP applications was multi-layered, involving several government departments and significant challenges in verification, particularly after the collapse of the Afghan government.

• Application Submission: Initially, applications could be submitted online, requiring detailed personal information, employment history, and evidence of their connection to the UK government. Applicants were asked to describe the nature of their work, the period of employment, and how it put them at risk.

• Verification of Service: The MOD and FCDO played a critical role in verifying applicants’ employment claims. This involved cross-referencing names against internal databases, payroll records, and human resources files. For many years of the conflict, paper records predominated, and the rapid departure from Afghanistan meant that some records might not have been fully digitised or accessible. This presented a significant hurdle, as many Afghans lacked formal employment contracts or payslips, or these documents were destroyed or inaccessible post-Taliban takeover. Consequently, the reliance often fell on anecdotal evidence, corroboration from former UK military or diplomatic personnel, or internal UK government knowledge of individuals [House of Commons Library, 2022].

• Threat Assessment: Beyond verifying employment, a crucial part of the process was assessing the ‘serious and imminent threat’ faced by the applicant. This involved evaluating the nature of their role (e.g., frontline interpreter vs. static administrative role), their visibility, any specific threats they had received, and the general security situation in their region of Afghanistan. This assessment was often challenging given the fluid security situation and the difficulty in gathering real-time, verifiable intelligence on individual threats from outside the country.

• Eligibility for Family Members: ARAP also provided for the relocation of eligible immediate family members, typically spouses/partners and dependent children. The definition of ‘dependent’ often followed standard UK immigration rules, usually children under 18. This provision was critical, as the risk to Afghan staff often extended directly to their families, who could also be targeted by the Taliban or other hostile actors.

3.3. Exclusion Criteria and Appeals

While ARAP aimed to be inclusive of those who had supported the UK, certain exclusion criteria were in place to prevent the entry of individuals deemed a risk to UK national security or with a criminal record. Individuals with serious criminal convictions or those identified as a threat to national security were ineligible, regardless of their past service. This reflected standard practice in UK immigration policy [UK Government, 2021].

Regarding appeals, the process was often opaque and challenging for applicants. If an application was rejected, individuals could request a review of the decision, but the process for submitting further evidence or challenging the initial assessment was complex, particularly for those still in Afghanistan or third countries without legal representation. The lack of a formal, independent appeals body akin to an immigration tribunal for ARAP decisions led to significant frustration and, in many cases, contributed to the ongoing legal challenges against the scheme’s administration [EIN, 2023]. The burden of proof often fell heavily on the applicant, who, as mentioned, frequently lacked the necessary documentation or safe means to provide it.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

4. Implementation Challenges – A Deeper Dive

The implementation of ARAP, despite its vital humanitarian intent, was beset by a multitude of formidable challenges that significantly impacted its efficiency, fairness, and the welfare of applicants. These challenges were systemic, logistical, and, at times, deeply tragic.

4.1. Bureaucratic Bottlenecks and Processing Delays

One of the most persistent and widely criticised aspects of ARAP’s implementation was the profound processing delays and the resulting backlog of applications. As early as July 2022, reports indicated a staggering backlog of over 23,000 applications received since October 2021, with only a quarter of these having been processed [Human Rights Watch, 2022]. This sluggish pace of decision-making had severe consequences for applicants, many of whom remained in grave danger within Afghanistan or in precarious situations in transit countries.

The reasons for these delays were multifaceted. Firstly, there was an unprecedented volume of applications following the fall of Kabul, far exceeding initial projections. Secondly, the inter-departmental coordination required between the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), and the Home Office proved cumbersome. Each department had its own procedures, databases, and verification processes, leading to inefficiencies and communication breakdowns. The MOD was responsible for verifying employment history, the FCDO for threat assessments, and the Home Office for immigration processing and ultimately, granting visas. The lack of a unified, streamlined process exacerbated delays.

Furthermore, the complexity of verifying claims from a country where the governing authority had collapsed and official records were often inaccessible or destroyed added significant time. Staffing levels within the ARAP processing units were frequently criticised as insufficient to handle the caseload, leading to extended waiting times for decisions. For applicants, these delays translated into prolonged periods of anxiety, financial hardship (as many had lost their livelihoods), and continued exposure to threats from the Taliban, who actively sought out those who had worked with foreign forces. Many reported feeling abandoned and betrayed, their hopes for safety dwindling with each passing month without a decision.

4.2. Access to Application Pathways and Third-Country Requirements

A critical and arguably most debilitating challenge for ARAP applicants was the stringent requirement to travel to a third country to complete the application process, specifically to provide biometric data at a UK Visa Application Centre (VAC). Following the withdrawal of British diplomatic presence from Afghanistan in August 2021, there was no longer any avenue for in-country processing [Migration Observatory, 2022].

This policy created insurmountable barriers for many eligible Afghans. Firstly, securing a visa for a neighbouring country (such as Pakistan, Iran, or Tajikistan) was incredibly difficult and often expensive. These countries themselves imposed strict visa requirements, and the chaotic situation in Afghanistan made obtaining necessary documentation, such as passports, virtually impossible for many. Secondly, the physical journey to a border and then to a VAC in a third country was fraught with peril. Many applicants had to traverse long distances across a country now controlled by the Taliban, risking checkpoints, harassment, and violence. The costs associated with travel, accommodation in transit countries, and visa fees for these countries placed an unbearable financial burden on families, many of whom were already impoverished. Some reports indicated that individuals spent their life savings or went into debt to attempt these journeys [Human Rights Watch, 2022].

Moreover, once in a third country, applicants often faced further insecurity, including the risk of deportation back to Afghanistan if their stay was deemed illegal or their visa expired before their ARAP application was processed. This pushed many into irregular migration channels, making them vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers and human traffickers. The lack of safe and legal routes out of Afghanistan fundamentally undermined the humanitarian intent of ARAP, creating an impossible dilemma for many eligible individuals trapped within the country.

4.3. Data Security and Privacy Breaches

A deeply disturbing and widely publicised implementation failure involved a significant data breach in September 2021. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) mistakenly sent an email to eligible ARAP applicants without using ‘blind carbon copy’ (BCC) protection [Financial Times, 2021a]. This error exposed the email addresses of over 250 individuals, many of whom were still in Afghanistan and actively in hiding from the Taliban due to their prior work with British forces. The leaked email addresses, often containing personal names, provided a direct digital trail that could lead to the identification and targeting of these vulnerable individuals and their families. This breach was not merely an administrative oversight; it was a profound failure of duty of care that directly jeopardised the lives of those the policy was designed to protect.

Subsequent investigations revealed systemic failures in data handling, and the MOD swiftly accepted full responsibility, offering an unreserved apology. The Defence Secretary acknowledged the ‘appalling’ error and ordered an immediate investigation. The MOD pledged to pay compensation to the affected individuals, with initial payouts exceeding £1.6 million [Financial Times, 2021b]. This incident severely eroded trust in the UK government’s ability to protect its former Afghan partners and highlighted critical deficiencies in data protection protocols during a highly sensitive humanitarian operation. It also underscored the psychological toll on applicants, who now faced the additional burden of knowing their identities might have been compromised.

4.4. Challenges of Identification and Verification

The tumultuous environment in Afghanistan presented immense challenges for the UK authorities in identifying and verifying the eligibility of applicants. Many Afghans did not possess formal identification documents (such as passports or national ID cards) or had lost them during the chaotic evacuation or in the subsequent displacement. Proving employment history without official papers, especially for those who worked for contractors or in informal capacities, was exceptionally difficult. The absence of a functioning Afghan government meant that traditional methods of verifying educational qualifications, professional certifications, or even birth records were largely unavailable.

This lack of verifiable documentation led to a reliance on anecdotal evidence or corroboration from former UK military commanders, which, while valuable, could be time-consuming and inconsistent. It also opened the door to potential fraudulent claims, necessitating rigorous vetting processes that further contributed to delays and consumed significant administrative resources. Balancing the imperative of thorough security checks with the urgent need for timely processing became a constant tension for ARAP administrators. The risk-aaverse approach, while understandable from a security perspective, disproportionately penalised genuine applicants who struggled to meet stringent evidentiary requirements in a collapsed state.

4.5. Accommodation and Resettlement Challenges in the UK

Beyond the immediate challenge of relocation, the UK faced significant obstacles in the long-term resettlement and integration of ARAP beneficiaries. Upon arrival, many Afghans, particularly those evacuated during Operation Pitting, were initially accommodated in hotels and temporary bridging accommodation. While intended as a short-term solution, many families spent months, and even over a year, in hotels due to a severe shortage of suitable long-term housing. This prolonged reliance on temporary accommodation led to significant costs for the government and had detrimental impacts on the well-being and integration prospects of the new arrivals, particularly children [Local Government Association, 2022].

Local authorities, tasked with providing permanent housing, education, and social support, faced immense pressure. Housing shortages, particularly for larger families, and a lack of suitable properties, coupled with funding uncertainties, hindered the smooth transition. Furthermore, many relocated Afghans arrived with significant trauma, having witnessed conflict, persecution, and displacement. Access to appropriate mental health services, language support, employment opportunities, and educational provisions for children became critical challenges. While the UK government collaborated with local authorities and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to facilitate resettlement, the sheer scale of the task, combined with pre-existing pressures on public services, meant that the integration journey for many was complex and protracted.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

5. Outcomes and Relocation Statistics – A Quantitative and Qualitative Review

Despite the significant challenges faced during its implementation, the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) successfully facilitated the relocation of a substantial number of Afghan nationals to the United Kingdom, fulfilling, at least in part, the UK’s moral commitment. However, a comprehensive understanding of the outcomes requires both quantitative data and a qualitative appreciation of the resettlement journey.

5.1. Comprehensive Relocation Data

As of the announcement of ARAP’s closure for new applications in July 2025, the UK government stated that over 34,000 Afghans had been successfully relocated to the UK under the scheme [UK Parliament, 2025]. This figure represents a significant humanitarian undertaking, especially considering the complex circumstances of the evacuation and subsequent processing.

• Operation Pitting Evacuees: A substantial portion of these 34,000 individuals, approximately 8,000, were evacuated during the chaotic but effective Operation Pitting in August 2021 [Wikipedia, Operation Pitting]. These individuals often arrived with minimal possessions, having left everything behind in their desperate flight from Kabul.

• Post-Evacuation Relocations: The remaining majority of the 34,000 figure comprises individuals who applied for ARAP after the immediate evacuation phase and were subsequently processed from Afghanistan or third countries. This indicates a sustained effort over several years to honour commitments to those who had not been part of the initial airlift. The numbers included principal applicants (the former staff members themselves) and their eligible family members (spouses, partners, and dependent children).

• Comparison with Previous Schemes: The scale of ARAP significantly surpassed that of its predecessor, the Afghan Locally Employed Staff (LES) Ex-Gratia Scheme (EGS), which relocated approximately 1,300 individuals. This highlights ARAP’s broader scope and the increased urgency perceived by the UK government in the face of the Taliban’s resurgence.

While the total number of relocated individuals is substantial, it is crucial to note that this figure does not account for the thousands of applications that were rejected or remain unprocessed, or for those who were unable to apply due to the logistical barriers discussed previously. Nevertheless, the scheme did provide a pathway to safety for tens of thousands of individuals whose lives were at direct risk due to their invaluable service to the UK.

5.2. Integration and Resettlement Outcomes in the UK

The successful relocation of individuals under ARAP marked the beginning, not the end, of a complex journey: integration into British society. This phase required extensive collaboration between central government departments (Home Office, MOD), local authorities across the UK, and a wide array of charitable organisations and community groups. The overall objective was to support these new arrivals in building sustainable lives and becoming self-sufficient contributors to their new communities.

• Accommodation Solutions: As highlighted in the challenges section, the initial reliance on bridging hotels was a significant issue. However, over time, concerted efforts were made to move families into more permanent housing. Local authorities played a crucial role in sourcing accommodation, often adapting existing social housing stock or working with private landlords. This process was gradual and varied significantly across different regions of the UK, depending on housing availability and local authority capacity.

• Language and Education: For many Afghan arrivals, language barriers presented a significant hurdle to integration and employment. Access to English language lessons (ESOL – English for Speakers of Other Languages) was paramount. Children were enrolled in local schools, and specific support was often provided to help them adjust to the British educational system and curriculum. Many arrived with limited or interrupted schooling, requiring tailored educational pathways.

• Employment Support: Supporting adults into employment was a key focus for long-term integration. This involved offering advice on job searching, CV writing, interview skills, and recognition of foreign qualifications. While many Afghan former staff were highly skilled, translating those skills into the UK job market, often compounded by language difficulties and cultural differences, proved challenging. Some charitable organisations and local councils provided bespoke employment support programmes.

• Health and Well-being: Many ARAP beneficiaries arrived with complex health needs, including physical injuries sustained during conflict and significant psychological trauma stemming from their experiences in Afghanistan and the displacement journey. Providing access to physical healthcare through the National Health Service (NHS) and culturally appropriate mental health support was a critical component of the resettlement effort. Community groups and specialist NGOs often played a vital role in providing this sensitive support.

• Community Integration: Beyond practical support, fostering community integration was essential. Local communities, volunteers, and faith groups often extended a warm welcome, assisting with everything from navigating public transport to finding local amenities and building social networks. While successes were evident in many areas, the integration journey is a long-term process that requires sustained effort and resources, addressing issues of cultural adaptation, social isolation, and discrimination where they arise.

5.3. Cost Implications of ARAP

The implementation of ARAP and the subsequent resettlement efforts represented a substantial financial commitment by the UK government. While exact comprehensive figures are difficult to ascertain publicly, the costs encompassed several key areas:

• Evacuation Costs: Operation Pitting itself involved significant military expenditure, including the deployment of personnel, aircraft, and associated logistics during a high-stakes emergency operation. These costs were integrated into the broader defence budget.

• Bridging Accommodation: The prolonged use of hotels and temporary accommodation for thousands of ARAP arrivals was a major expenditure. Reports indicated that the daily cost per person in bridging hotels was significant, accumulating to hundreds of millions of pounds over the period of their use [The Independent, 2022]. This cost was a subject of considerable parliamentary and public debate.

• Resettlement Support: Funds were allocated to local authorities to support resettlement efforts, covering housing, education, social care, and other integration services. While this funding was crucial, local authorities often argued it was insufficient to meet the full needs of the new arrivals given the existing pressures on their services.

• Administrative and Processing Costs: The administrative overhead of running the ARAP scheme, including staff salaries, IT infrastructure, and operational costs for processing applications (both in the UK and in third countries), also contributed to the overall financial outlay.

While the financial investment was considerable, the UK government consistently framed it as a necessary expenditure to uphold a ‘moral obligation’ and safeguard the nation’s reputation. The long-term costs of failed integration or the humanitarian consequences of abandoning former partners would arguably have been far greater.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

6. Ongoing Needs, Legal Challenges, and Future Policy Considerations

Despite the substantial numbers of individuals relocated under ARAP and the scheme’s eventual closure for new applications, the policy’s legacy remains a subject of intense debate, particularly concerning those who continue to seek assistance. The complex interplay of ongoing needs, legal scrutiny, and the lessons learned from ARAP hold significant implications for future UK and international humanitarian policy.

6.1. The ‘Left Behind’: Persistent Needs and Risks

Even after the formal closure of ARAP for new applications, a significant number of Afghan nationals who supported the UK mission continue to reside in Afghanistan or in precarious situations in third countries, still seeking a pathway to safety. This group includes:

• Rejected Applicants: Individuals whose ARAP applications were denied, often due to perceived ineligibility, insufficient evidence, or failure to meet the ‘serious and imminent threat’ criteria, despite their compelling claims of service and risk. Many of these individuals contend that their rejections were based on a flawed assessment or an inability to provide evidence due to the circumstances in Afghanistan.

• Inaccessible Applicants: Those who were eligible under ARAP criteria but were unable to apply before the scheme’s closure due to the severe logistical barriers, lack of awareness, or inability to access safe passage to a third country for processing. Their plight is particularly dire, as they now have no direct dedicated route to the UK linked to their service.

• Pending Cases: While new applications are closed, a backlog of applications submitted before the July 2025 deadline continues to be processed. The waiting period for these individuals remains a source of profound anxiety and ongoing risk. The transparency surrounding the processing of these residual cases is crucial.

These ‘left behind’ individuals face continued threats from the Taliban, who perceive their collaboration with foreign forces as treasonous. Reports from human rights organisations consistently highlight the dangers faced by former Afghan staff, including arbitrary detentions, violence, and extrajudicial killings [Amnesty International, 2021]. The inability to access safe and legal routes out of Afghanistan means that many are forced into hiding or attempt perilous irregular journeys, exacerbating their vulnerability.

6.2. Legal Scrutiny and Parliamentary Oversight

ARAP’s implementation has been subject to extensive legal and parliamentary scrutiny, reflecting concerns about its effectiveness, fairness, and adherence to the UK’s moral obligations. Several key avenues of oversight include:

• Judicial Reviews: A number of legal challenges, including judicial reviews, have been launched against the UK government concerning various aspects of ARAP. These challenges have focused on issues such as the unacceptable delays in processing applications, the rationale for rejecting specific cases, the restrictive nature of the eligibility criteria, and the legality of the scheme’s closure [EIN, 2023]. These legal actions often seek to compel the government to process applications more swiftly, reconsider rejected cases, or establish more accessible pathways. While individual case outcomes vary, these legal challenges have kept the pressure on the government to justify its policies and operations.

• Parliamentary Committee Investigations: Multiple parliamentary committees have conducted inquiries into ARAP and the broader UK response to the Afghanistan crisis. The Foreign Affairs Committee, Defence Committee, and the Home Affairs Committee have published scathing reports criticising the government’s handling of the evacuation, the slow pace of ARAP processing, and the inadequacy of support for eligible Afghans. For instance, the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report in 2022 described the Foreign Office’s handling of the evacuation as ‘dysfunctional’ and a ‘catastrophe’ [House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022]. These reports have often called for greater transparency, accelerated processing, and a more humane approach.

• NGO and Media Scrutiny: Human rights organisations (e.g., Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), refugee advocacy groups, and independent media outlets have played a crucial role in documenting the plight of ARAP applicants, highlighting systemic failures, and advocating for policy changes. Their reports, often based on direct testimony from affected individuals, have provided vital external scrutiny and kept the issue in the public domain.

6.3. Interplay with Other UK Schemes: A Complex Landscape

ARAP did not operate in isolation but was part of a broader, sometimes confusing, landscape of UK immigration and resettlement schemes for Afghan nationals. Understanding its relationship with these other routes is essential:

• Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS): Launched concurrently with ARAP in August 2021, the ACRS was designed to resettle vulnerable Afghans who had not worked directly for the UK government but were at high risk from the Taliban (e.g., women and girls at risk, human rights defenders, journalists, persecuted minorities). ACRS operates through three pathways, including referrals from UNHCR, direct referrals, and a pathway for those evacuated during Operation Pitting. Importantly, ACRS is not an application scheme; individuals cannot directly apply to it [UK Government, 2023]. This non-application nature makes it difficult for many vulnerable Afghans to access, creating a clear distinction from ARAP which was initially application-based.

• Family Reunion Route: For Afghans already in the UK, the standard Family Reunion immigration route allows them to sponsor eligible family members to join them in the UK. However, this route is often slow, requires significant documentation, and places the financial burden on the sponsor in the UK, making it inaccessible for many newly arrived ARAP beneficiaries who are still finding their feet. Furthermore, it does not address the situation of those in Afghanistan who have no family already in the UK.

The existence of multiple schemes with different eligibility criteria and application processes has led to confusion, frustration, and a perception of inequity among the Afghan population. The closure of ARAP for new applications further concentrates the pressure on these alternative, often more restrictive, pathways.

6.4. Future Policy Lessons from ARAP

The experience of ARAP offers crucial lessons for the UK and international community regarding future large-scale humanitarian and relocation efforts in post-conflict or crisis situations:

• Proactive Planning: The need for comprehensive contingency planning for the evacuation and resettlement of local staff in advance of any military or diplomatic withdrawal. A robust framework should be in place before a crisis escalates.

• Streamlined Processes and Inter-Agency Coordination: The importance of clear, unified, and efficient administrative processes across all relevant government departments. A single, dedicated command structure with clear lines of responsibility and integrated IT systems could prevent bureaucratic bottlenecks and enhance responsiveness.

• Flexible Eligibility and Accessibility: Policies should be adaptable to rapidly evolving ground realities. Access pathways must be safe, legal, and truly accessible, particularly when in-country diplomatic presence is lost. This might involve establishing secure transit hubs or innovative remote processing capabilities.

• Robust Data Management and Security: Upholding the highest standards of data protection is paramount for the safety of applicants, especially those in hiding. Regular audits and robust training are essential.

• Comprehensive Post-Arrival Support: Relocation is only the first step. Long-term, well-funded support for housing, language acquisition, employment, mental health, and social integration is critical for successful resettlement and the well-being of arrivals. This requires sustained collaboration between central and local governments, and civil society.

• Clear and Consistent Communication: Transparency in eligibility criteria, application status, and policy changes is vital to manage expectations and maintain trust with affected communities and the wider public.

Learning these lessons from ARAP is indispensable to ensure that future commitments to those who assist the UK’s foreign policy and security objectives are met with greater efficiency, humanity, and foresight.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

7. Comparative Analysis with Other Nations – Broader International Responses

The fall of Kabul and the subsequent humanitarian crisis prompted varied responses from international powers that had maintained a military presence in Afghanistan. A comparative analysis of these national approaches highlights distinct policy philosophies, operational challenges, and scales of commitment, providing valuable insights into the complexities of post-conflict relocation efforts.

7.1. United States: Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome

The United States, having led the two-decade military intervention in Afghanistan, undertook the largest and most complex evacuation and resettlement effort. This was primarily conducted under two overarching initiatives:

• Operation Allies Refuge (OAR): Launched in July 2021, ahead of the final withdrawal, OAR was a large-scale military operation focused on evacuating eligible Afghan nationals, primarily those who had applied for or were eligible for the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. The SIV program, established in 2009 for Iraqi and later Afghan interpreters and translators, aimed to provide a pathway to lawful permanent residency in the U.S. for those who faced threats due to their service. The operation rapidly expanded during August 2021 as the security situation deteriorated, becoming a frantic airlift from Kabul Airport, similar in chaos and scale to the UK’s Operation Pitting [Wikipedia, Operation Allies Refuge]. Between July and August 2021, over 124,000 people were evacuated from Afghanistan by the U.S. and its allies, including tens of thousands of at-risk Afghans.

• Operation Allies Welcome (OAW): Following the initial evacuation, OAW was established to coordinate the resettlement of Afghan arrivals within the United States. Between July 2021 and March 2022, over 73,000 Afghans were paroled into the U.S. as part of these operations, granting them temporary legal status and work authorisation [Wikipedia, Operation Allies Refuge]. The U.S. faced immense logistical challenges in processing such a large number of individuals, with many housed temporarily on military bases across the country before being matched with resettlement agencies. Challenges included significant backlogs in SIV processing, difficulties in establishing long-term housing solutions, and ensuring adequate support for integration, including healthcare, education, and employment [Migration Policy Institute, 2022]. The sheer scale of the U.S. effort, driven by a long-standing SIV program and a more extensive military presence, made its response quantitatively larger than the UK’s.

7.2. Canada: Vulnerable Persons and Multi-Pathway Resettlement

Canada took a distinctive approach, announcing ambitious plans to resettle 40,000 vulnerable Afghans. While Canada also prioritised Afghans who had assisted its military and diplomatic efforts, its program extended its focus significantly beyond this group to include broader categories of at-risk individuals [Global Affairs Canada, 2021]. Key aspects of Canada’s strategy included:

• Broad Vulnerability Criteria: Canada’s program specifically targeted vulnerable groups, including women and girls, members of Afghanistan’s LGBTQ+ community, human rights workers, journalists, and persecuted religious or ethnic minorities. This broader scope reflected Canada’s long-standing humanitarian tradition and its emphasis on protecting those most at risk, regardless of direct affiliation with Canadian forces.

• Multi-Pathway Resettlement: Canada leveraged both government-assisted refugee programs and its robust private sponsorship program. The latter allowed Canadian citizens and permanent residents to privately sponsor eligible Afghan refugees, providing a complementary pathway and mobilising civil society in the resettlement effort [Government of Canada, 2021].

• Scale and Progress: By August 2022, the first anniversary of the fall of Kabul, Canada had welcomed 17,375 Afghans, indicating significant progress towards its 40,000 target [Wikipedia, Afghan refugees]. While Canada also faced challenges in processing applications, particularly for those still in Afghanistan or third countries, its multi-pathway approach and focus on broader vulnerability criteria distinguished its response from the more narrowly defined criteria of ARAP or even the U.S. SIV program.

7.3. Germany: Balancing Humanitarianism with Strict Immigration Controls

Germany’s response to the Afghan crisis has been marked by a complex interplay of humanitarian commitments and a strong emphasis on maintaining strict immigration controls, particularly in light of previous large-scale refugee arrivals. Germany participated in the initial evacuation efforts from Kabul, airlifting thousands of its own citizens and eligible Afghans.

• Evacuation and Initial Intake: Germany evacuated approximately 5,300 people from Kabul in August 2021, including German citizens, Afghan local staff, and vulnerable individuals. Subsequent efforts focused on bringing additional local staff and their families to Germany through more structured processes [Deutsche Welle, 2021].

• Controversial Deportation Proposals: More recently, Germany’s Interior Minister proposed establishing direct communication with the Taliban to facilitate the deportation of Afghan migrants who had committed serious crimes, even those whose asylum applications had been rejected [Financial Times, 2024]. This highly controversial initiative, sparked by a fatal knife attack involving an Afghan national, ignited a fierce debate among coalition partners and opposition parties. Critics condemned the proposal as morally reprehensible and practically unfeasible, given the Taliban’s human rights record and the lack of diplomatic recognition. This stance highlights a tension within German policy between humanitarian obligations and a perceived need for stricter enforcement of immigration rules, contrasting sharply with the UK’s ARAP which was solely focused on relocation.

7.4. Key Differences and Similarities in National Approaches

The comparative analysis reveals several key distinctions and commonalities in the international response:

• Eligibility Scope: The UK’s ARAP and the U.S.’s SIV program primarily focused on Afghan nationals who had directly assisted their respective military and diplomatic missions. Canada, while including this group, adopted a significantly broader humanitarian approach by prioritising wider categories of vulnerable individuals. Germany’s recent rhetoric, while not cancelling existing local staff schemes, indicates a stricter approach to overall migration control.

• Scale of Commitment: The U.S. undertook the largest overall evacuation and resettlement, reflecting the scale of its involvement in Afghanistan. The UK’s ARAP was substantial for its context, relocating over 34,000 individuals. Canada set an ambitious per capita target for vulnerable Afghans.

• Processing and Access: All nations faced immense challenges in processing applications, particularly for those still in Afghanistan without safe passage. The reliance on third-country access for biometrics and interviews was a common and significant barrier across the board, leading to delays and humanitarian concerns.

• Resettlement Models: While all nations provided post-arrival support, the models varied. The U.S. and UK largely relied on government-funded resettlement, whereas Canada successfully leveraged a robust private sponsorship program, demonstrating a different pathway for integration.

• Political Context and Public Opinion: Each nation’s response was shaped by its domestic political landscape, public opinion, and past experiences with refugee crises. Germany’s recent push for deportations reflects a different political calculus than, for instance, Canada’s more expansive humanitarian intake.

In conclusion, while all nations involved in Afghanistan faced a similar moral imperative to protect their Afghan partners, the specific policies, their scope, and their implementation varied significantly. These differences reflect varying national priorities, immigration philosophies, and capacities, offering valuable lessons for designing more effective and humane responses to future complex humanitarian crises.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

8. Conclusion

The Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) represents a defining chapter in the United Kingdom’s post-conflict commitment to Afghanistan. Launched in response to the ethical imperative to safeguard Afghan nationals who had rendered invaluable support to British military and diplomatic efforts, ARAP sought to fulfil a profound moral obligation. Through its operational history, spanning the chaotic emergency evacuation of Operation Pitting and subsequent structured processing, the scheme successfully facilitated the relocation of over 34,000 Afghans to the UK, providing a critical lifeline to individuals whose lives were at direct risk due to their unwavering service.

However, this comprehensive analysis underscores that ARAP’s implementation was fraught with significant and often heartbreaking challenges. Persistent bureaucratic bottlenecks and processing delays condemned thousands to prolonged periods of uncertainty and danger. The stringent requirement for applicants to reach third countries for processing created insurmountable logistical and financial hurdles, pushing many into precarious and unsafe migratory paths. The deeply regrettable data security breach further compounded the risks to vulnerable individuals, eroding trust and highlighting critical systemic deficiencies in data handling. Moreover, the complexities of verifying identities and employment records in a collapsed state, coupled with the immense task of integrating thousands of new arrivals into UK society, presented ongoing, multifaceted challenges.

While the UK’s commitment through ARAP was substantial, a comparative analysis with similar programs in other nations, such as the United States, Canada, and Germany, reveals both shared difficulties and divergent policy approaches. The varying scopes of eligibility, scales of ambition, and resettlement models across these countries offer crucial insights into the complexities inherent in such large-scale humanitarian undertakings. The U.S. pursued a vast SIV-led effort, Canada embraced a broader vulnerability-based approach leveraging private sponsorship, while Germany navigated a more cautious path balancing humanitarian intake with stricter immigration controls.

Moving forward, the experience of ARAP yields vital lessons for the UK and the international community. Future responses to similar crises must prioritise proactive planning, establish streamlined and integrated inter-agency processes, ensure truly accessible and safe pathways for relocation, and embed robust data protection mechanisms. Furthermore, the commitment must extend beyond relocation to comprehensive, long-term support for integration, addressing housing, employment, education, and mental health needs. The ongoing plight of those ‘left behind’ under ARAP serves as a poignant reminder that moral obligations are not finite and require sustained political will, flexible policies, and efficient administration to truly honour those who have served. Learning from ARAP’s successes and, critically, its shortcomings, is imperative to enhance the effectiveness and humanity of future relocation and resettlement programs in an increasingly volatile global landscape.

Many thanks to our sponsor Esdebe who helped us prepare this research report.

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